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STATE OF IOAHO 
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY GLE OSTO .CLERK 
8 Y-;:::9'""--:-1'-0::::......~-
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DMSION 
In the Matter of the Estate or 
MEL VIN PETER.SON. 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2007-00266 
CATHIE PETERSON'S 
RESPONSIVE BRIEF 
COMES NOW BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, FEATHERSTON LAW "FIRM, CHT.O., 
attorneys for C.athie Peterson. individually, and hereby submits the foltowins responsive brief 
L STAT.£ OF FACTS 
This case nrises from the State of Idaho, .Department of Health and Welfare's., 
("Ocpartmentj claim for Medicaid rcimbmsemenl asserted against the Estate of Melvin 
Peterson. 
On Decembers. 20011, by deed, Mr. Peterson conveyed his home to Cathie Peterson 
retaining a life estate to himself.. At the time, Cathie Peterson resided in the home and was 
caregivt?r for her :fu.thcr. Catllie Peterson expended several thousand dollm:s in making 
improvcmcn~ to her -very modest home from December, 2001, until the Department asserted a 
claim to the property in this proceeding. 
Melvin Peter.son began recei'Ving Medicaid benefils several years after deeding the 
home to Ms. Peterson. 
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Upon Mr. Peterson's death on March 3, 2007, the Court appointed Ms. Cathie Peterson 
as Personal Representative of the Estate. Ms. Peterson filed an inventory of the Melvin 
Peterson Estate. Subsequently. upon the Court's Order to do so, Ms. Peterson included in lhe 
inventory of the Estaie of Melvin Peterson, the .. life ~late" at a ZL'TO value. 
The Department objected to the valuation. 1n response, Cathie Peterson) as Personal 
Representative of the Estate, filed a Motion to Hire Appraiser to dr:terminc the value of the life 
estate. Surprisingly, the LA..Jl8tlment objected to the Personal Rcprcscnlative, Cathie 
Peterson· s, Motion to Hire Appraiser slating that 1.he proposed appraiser was not .. qualified to 
provide such opinion evidence because he is not an actuary or a person otherwise possessed 
with specialized knowledge of life expectancies". The State further alleged in thcir objection 
that they would only agree to the appointment of an appr-aiser to determine fair market value of 
the fee ownership of the property so as to apply the "life estate table contained in. I.D.A.P .A § 
16.03.05.837.02 .•. in order to properly dctt..'Tt'nine the actual value of the life cstalc interest." 
The Department's objection further stated that the cost of such appraisal should not be 
home by the Estate., but rather by the Personal Representative, individually. 
The Department ha..; been intent on using the LD.A.P.A. Table from the beginning, 
refusing to permit a qualified opinion of value. 
Cathie Peterson has ~ been joined in. this action as an individual or in her 
individual capacity. She specially appc:arcd through the undersigned counsel reserving 
jurisdiction and service of process after it became clear that the State ofidaho intended to force 
~ .lliir :firm"" the sale of her residence and home based upon I.D.A.P .A. 16.03 .05.837 {Rule 837). 
!Dlfrlkf!l'. :r~ 
lll1'111 r:. ;r<#lfim1.in• 
Jtmlt9!1'. :rtiirkr.trim 
>l~•rLlllOI 
U.f.1..it« .... 01. ... , 
~"'· ,1,1a.1u~ 
(llr¥}~ 
:t1tc.¢rJITJ .lf1"1"1f00 
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On July 15, 2009. the Department filed a Petition to Compel Sale of Home and to 
Compel Payment to the Department of i~ cla:im.1 The Court's Order granting the 
Department's Petition to Compel Sale of Home was overturned on appeal. On remand. the 
Court removed Ms. Cathie Peterson as Personal Representative of the Estate of Melvin 
Peterson and appointed the State of Idaho,. Department of Health and Welfme, as Successor 
Personal Represenhltivc:. 
At hearing on September 29~ 2011. the State of Idaho as Successor Personal 
Representative brought before the Court a Petition for Entry of Findings of Fact and 
Conclw,ions of Law. The Department presented no evidence as to the value of the real 
property or life estate in question. 
The Department asserts Omt the Court should make a ~g"' as to the percentage or 
value attributnbJe to Mr. Melvin Pctcrson"s life estate at the time ofhls death based upon Rule 
837 and upon Idaho Code§ S6·218(4)(b)(201 l). 
For the reasons discussed below, neither provisions arc applicable aod the Court should 
d~y the State of Idaho's Petition for EntJ:y of F"indings of Fact and Conclmiions of Law in their 
totality. 
Il. ARGUMENT 
A. Rule 837 is inapplicable. 
The State ofldaho 8fbY\les that LO.AP A 16.03.0S entitled Rules Govcming Eligioility 
for Aid to the Aged. .Blind and Disnbled dictates the Court~s ruling in valuing Mr. Peterson's 
1 The Petition to Compel the Home at that time owned in fee simple was never served on or 
brought us an independent action against Cathie Peterson., an individual. Cathie Peterson has 
participated. ns an individual in this matter pursuant only to a special appearance reserving 
jurisdiction., venue, service of process and due process filed September 17, 2010. 
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lifo estate at the time of his death. ·111c fundamental issue of whether a life est.ale hus v-,llue at 
the time of death is a matter of common law principles and will be discussed further below. 
Rule 837 reads in pertinent part as follows: 
RULE 837 - LTFE EST A TE AS ASSET TilANSFER. 
.01. Tnm.od'er of n Remainder Interest When a 
life estate in real property is retained by an individual, 
and a remainder interest in the property is transferred 
during the look b!lck period for less than the fu.ir market 
value of the remainder inter=,'t transf~ the value of 
the uncompensated remainder is subject 10 the assert 
transfer penalty as described in Sections 831 through 
835 of these rules. To compute the value of the lifu 
eslate remainder, multiply the fair market value of the 
real property at the time of transfer by the remainder 
fuctor for the participanes age at the time of transfer 
l.isted in the: following table: 
T.D.A.P .A. 16.03.05.837 
r underline added] 
A simple reading of Rule 837 above makes clear that the rule was adopted for 
application in assessing a value to a lifu estate in determining a recipienCs a...::..-:et transfer 
penalty "during the look back period" during their lifetime. By its very definition above, the 
rule and the remainder table is used and onl)! applied during the lifetime of an applicant for 
b<.."nefits to detennine an appropriate asset transfer pcnalty.1 
At no time docs the State of Idaho ever explain their debire to apply a Rule 837 under 
these circumstances. "TI1c value of the life estate is deter.mined by a formula which talccs into 
account the age and life expectancy oft.he life tenant. The longer the life expectancy of the life 
2 Ac:set transfer penalties are assessed pursuant to Rules 831 through 836 to Medicaid 
participan1s in long term care or H.C.B.S. Sec T.D.A.P .A. 16.03.05.831. 
CA"l11IE PETERSON'S RESl*ONSIVE DRllCI<' • .c 
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tenant, the greater is the value of the life estate". West v. Tax Commission. 99 Tdaho 26, 27, 
576P.2d1060, 1061 (1978). 
The process of determining an asset t:ranstbr penalty during the lifetime of the Medicaid 
participant certainly involves actuarial determinations, however, the valuation of a Hle estute, at 
the time of a m~+uring life's death, no longer logically involves those same actuarial 
detc:nninations. The decedent has died. There is no further accounting for age or life 
expectancy, 
The Idaho Probate Code requires on1y that a Personal Rcprcscncative prepare an 
inventory of property "owned by the decedent at the time of his death". Idaho Code§ IS-3-
706. It docs .not require a detenninution of assets owned prior to the death of the decedent or 
up to the dnt.e of death~ but only those 3$Ct.s at the lime of his death. 
Only property which the decedent owned at the time of his death is subject to inventory 
and appraisement under LC.§ IS-3-106. Since the life estate terminated at Melvin Peterson's 
death. there is no asset to value and use of Rule 837 to set such a value is improper. by the 
plain terms of the Ruic and by simple logic. 
B. Idaho Code§ 56-218 does not apply in tbc<Cc circumd.a.necs. 
The Stute of Idaho argues in their closing brief that I.C. § 56-218(4)(b) defines an ~'tate 
that is subject to Medicaid recovery. Although not expressly stated, it appears that the 
Department's position is that this definition of estate assets overrides the common Jaw or 
Probate Code. 
~ .uzw ~ t»< For the rcaso.llS set forth below~ the plain terms and language of Idaho Code § 56-218 
~ll'. ,-11111imtdn 
~i;.~=:: docs not require Ille inclusion of the life estate reserved by Melvin Peterson in 2001. 
~llt~ 
11.•.!J.~~ ... 
,:Mi;.{J"'f~t • .1 .. -
JllOl'J~ 
;1lil!;ll!QI) MJ.ofl'JIJ 
·~ ... ~,. 
ff(,;./i,>O'~l'Wll"I 
l\ l 0 
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For purposes of this section, the term ••estate•; shall include: 
(a) all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual~s estate, as defined for pwposes of 
~tale probate law; and 
(b) any other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any lesfil title or interest at the 
tjme of dcalh, to the extent or suchJntere!tj:, including 
such assets t'tl!.~£!! to a survivor, heir or ~ib'Tl of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorsbip, life cst:atc, living trust or other 
ammgement. 
LC. § 56-218(4)(2011) 
( cmpha.5is added] 
The statute docs not state that a decedent's life estute is to be included in his estate for 
Medicaid recovery. In~i:eac4 the statute refers to life estates conveyed to a survivor. 
For example, Mr. Peterson could have conveyed his property to his daughter in fee titl~ 
for his lifetime. That conveyance is a life cst:atc and may revert or transfer to a remainder at the 
time of Mr. Peterson's death. At his death, U1is interest is subject to Medicaid recovery under 
subsection (b). 
Jn th.is instance, Mr. Pel.t."l'Son did not convey a life CS1atc interest to Ms. Peterson 
before his death. Tfhe had. that interest would be subject to estate recovery in !he ~1ate. Mr. 
Peterson conveyed a remainder interest subject to his own reserved life estate. For that reason, 
the latter portion of the statute quoted above is not applicable. The Court should decline to 
make any findings of fact or conclw.ions oflaw applying Idaho Code § 56-218. 
'-lll 
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l. Idaho Code § 56-218 docs not require tbe inclusion of a life cstute 
a.q un asset for purposes of Medicaid recovery. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(a) provides .that the term estate shall include all real and 
personal property and other assets included wilhin lhe individual's estate as defined for 
purposes or state probate law·'. I.C. § S6-218(4Xa)(2011). 
The Idaho Probate Code imposes a duty upon the personal representative to inventory 
and appraise: all "property owned by the decedent at the time of his death, listing it with 
reasonable detail. and indicating as to each listed item its fuir market value as of the date of the 
decedent's death". LC.§ 15-3-706 (2011). 
Idaho Code § 15-1-201(16) defines an "eb'Ulle" as "all property of the decedent, 
including communizy propeey of the surviving spouse, subject to administxation, property or 
trusts. and property of any other person whose affuin: are !>'Ubjr:ct to this code as .it exists from 
time to time: during administration". Idaho Code§ IS-1-201(16)(2011). 
"A lite estate is an in1~1 in rcul property, the duration of which is limited by the life 
of some person." Tobias v. State Tax Commission., 85 Idaho 250, 25S, 378 P .2d 628, _ 
( 1963); quoting Thompson on Rc:al Property, Volume IT, § 780. 
"It is important to ~ however, that if the deceased owned a life estate during his 
or her ur~ lhe life e!.'1at.e wm terminate upon death and will not be part of the estate.." 121 
AmJur. -Proof ofl"acts 3d, 101 (2011). 
Fee simple absolute title by a grantor can be split during the 
conveyance into a present estate: and a future estate. The most 
comm.on present cmate is fhe life es1ate. The creation of the life 
estate usually involves words indicating that the possession is 
for life or some similar limitation •••• without .laoguage giving 
fhe lire t:!.iate owner the right to dispose of the property, the 
future interest cannot be conveyed by the life estate owner .•••• 
there arc two types of future estates associated with the life 
NOV-18-201l(FRI) 17:20 Fee' rston Law Firm [htd. (FAX)? 630400 P. 009/013 
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estate. These arc the reversion and the remainder • • •. A 
remainder is used when the grantor wants to convey ownership 
of the future interest to a third party. 
The Court pn.'"Vio1.JSly ordered the Personal Representative to include the life estate as 
an asset on the inventory. That was done and the life estate was valued by the fonner Personal 
Representative at zero value. As of this elate. the Court has heard no testimony or evidence that 
would indicate that the life estate has any value at the time of Mr. Peterson's death or that it is 
to be included by either Idaho Probate Code or under common law principles within the estate 
to be probated. 
The Department's claim relies entirely upon the Medicaid Rccovc:r:y Act found in Idaho 
Code § 56-218. However, the Department's i.nterpretation of LC. § 56-218 is not consistent 
with the aciual language of Idaho Code § 56-218. The statute defers to Probate Code for a 
determination of what interests are to be included. 
For the n:asons set forth herein, the Court wouJd commit error to assess any value to 
the life estate. as such a determination would be contrary to law. Indeed, lhe Jife estate should 
not have been included in the estate inventory. Tt was properly appraised at no value by Ms. 
Peterson, as former Personal Representative. 
C. Tiais CoJJrt lack." subject: matter iurisdiction to determine the issues befor.~ 
it. 
"It is the general rule that where title to real property is an issue between an estate and 
its heirs and a tJ1ird person, such issue must be tried in an independent action brought for that 
purpose in a competent tribunal and cannot be tried by the probate court." In re lrundj(s 
Estate. 79 Idaho 185, 193. 312 P .2d 1028, 1032 (1957). 
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II 
The State of Idaho seeks a court finding that they have a percentage interest based upon 
the asset transfer tables set forth in Rule 837. This finding is beyond the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the probate court. A...; indicated all along. Ms. Peterson is appearing only 
through a special appearance reserving jurisdiction, both pt..'"t'SOnal and subject matter, and this 
Court should decline to make or enter findings of fact and conclusions of law where the State 
ofTdaho has failed to establish subject matter for pt."l'SOnal jurisdiction. 
m. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the evidence in the record, the Court is asked to make the following 
findings of fact and conclUbions of law: 
I. Melvin Peterson conveyed fee title ownership to Calhie Pelerson in certain. real 
property on Oeccmber S, 2001, rcserviog to himself a life estate. 
2. Cathie Peterson, in reliance upon the deed, and us an occupant and possessor of 
said real propc:rty during Melvin Peterson's lifetime, made certain improvements and incurred. 
expenses for the improvement ort.he real property, as her ~idence, totaling ~cm.I thousand 
dollars. 
3. Several years later, Melvin Peterson applied for and received Medicrud benefits 
through the State ofJdaho, Department of Health and Welfare. 
4. The State of Idaho, Oi:partmcnt of Health and Welfiu'c, apparently determined 
at the time of Melvin Peterson's application that no asset transfer penalty should be imposed 
on the basis of Melvin Peterson's t'etnined life estate. 
s. Melvin Peterson died March 3, 2007, and was 83 years of age. 
6. At the time of Melvin Peterson's death, his life estate terminated by operation 
of law and at that date of death, Melvin Peterson held no legal interest in the real property. 
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7. The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, filed a .claim for 
Medicaid benefits of$171,386.94. 
8. Tbe State of ldaho ~provided an opportunity at trial on September 29, 2011, 
to introduce evidence of a proper valuation of the life eb"l:ale of Melvin Peterson at the time of 
his death and i.ntroduced no such evidence. 
9. By operation of law, the life Cb1utc of Melvin Peterson ceased to exist at the 
time of his death and~ therefore, had no value. 
10. The Court finds that the asset tranbfer penalty provisions applied to life estate 
and remainder intercsm under Rule 837 arc inapplicable to the circumstances of valuing a life 
estate at the time of death. 
11. The Court further finds that the provisions of Rule 837, ct seq. are specifically 
restricted to detr:nnining an appropriate value during the life of a Medicaid bencficiw:y for 
purposes of imposing an asset transfer penalty and is, therefore, inapplicable for pwposes of 
determining a life eb1nte value at the time of death. 
12. 1bc State of Idaho, having failed to provide any evidence as to the vulue of the 
life esinte, lhis Court finds that· no such value or interest can be attributed to the State of Idaho 
in and to that real property conveyed by Warranty Deed from Melvin Peterson to Cathie 
Peterson on December S, 2001. 
13. 1bc State of Idaho, Department or Heulth and Weltare, is not entitled to any 
lien or interest attributable to the life estate at issue in this matter. 
14. Further, the Court linds that Cuthic Peterson was not properly made a party to 
this proceeding by service of process or other appropriate due process that would vest this 
Court with personal jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson and/or the real property at issue. 
CATHIE PETERSON'S RESl'ONSIVE BRIEF .10 
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15. Further, the Magistrate Court. acting as Probate Court in these proceedings, 
lac~ subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Juw. 
16. Finally, the Court. acting in equity. finds that Cathie Peterson equitably relied 
upon the Warranty Deed dated December 5, 2001,. and inclllTed expenses, improving the real 
property in reliance upon the deed from Melvin Peterson totaling several thousand dollars. 
17. The Court furthi:r finds that the Department failed to file or perfect any proper 
Hen or other encumbrance which would provide actual or constructive notice to Cathie 
Pctc!son of the interests claimed by the State ofTdaho, Department of Health and Welfare. A-: 
such, the Court finds that it would be .inequitable for the Court to impose a lien or assess an 
interest in the real property to or in fuvor of the State of Idaho, Department of HcaJth and 
Welfure. ;Cr 
DA TED this~ day ofNovcmber, 2011. 
C\TillE PET&RSON'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF• t I 
RENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney for Cathie Peterson 
Individually 
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_____________________________ ) 
COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare, a claimant and 
successor personal representative herein (hereinai."'ter, the "Department"), and submits the 
following reply to "Cathie Peterson's Responsive Brief:" 
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I. 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE LIFE ESTATE IS AN 
ASSET OF THE ESTATE HAS ALREADY BEEN DECIDED. 
A. The Endlessly Repeated Argument That the Life Estate Is Not an Asset of the Estate 
Should Be Ignored. 
Cathie Peterson argues, yet again, that contrary to the plain language of Idaho Code § 56-
218( 4)(b ), the life estate has no value. This question was decided by the court more than three 
years ago. The Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim (June 12, 2008) established the 
life estate as an asset of the estate, and required Cathie Peterson, then personal representative, to 
include the life estate in the inventory and assign it an appropriate value. Her failure and refusal 
to assign the life estate an appropriate non-zero value was part of grounds for her removal as 
personal representative. Tr. (Oct. 7, 2010) p. 33, II. 11-17. Her removal was upheld on appeal by 
the District Court, and therefore, this is now the law of this case. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 
709, 201P.3d1282, 1286 (2009). At some point Peterson's endless rehashing of this long 
decided issue must end. 
B. Cathie Peterson's New Interpretation ofldaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b) Is Absurd. 
Peterson, for the first time, advances a new and novel reading of the expanded definition 
of estate found in Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b). She contends that it would only apply if Melvin 
Peterson had given a life estate to Cathie Peterson, rather than retained a life estate for himself. 
This is absurd because the reversionary interest would already be an asset of the estate under 
section (4)(a), and the expanded definition of estate in section (4)(b), which includes life estates, 
would be totally unnecessary. This construction is also contrary to every case that has construed 
the expanded definition of estate, including State Dept. of Human Services v. Willingham, 206 
REPLY BRIEF - 2 Y:IMRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\Pleadings\Reply Brief.wpd 
Or.App. 156, 136 P.3d 66 (2006), Banta v. Burke, 98 Cal.App.4th 788, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 
(2002), and In re Estate of Laughead, 696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2005), as well as Judge Gaskill's 
decision in the case of In re Estate of Grothe, Nez Perce County No. CV 02-02163. Peterson has 
cited no authority that would support her construction of the statute and there is none. 
II. 
THERE IS NO REASON RULE 837 SHOULD NOT APPLY 
TO THIS CASE. 
Peterson argues that the life estate tables in Rule 83 7 should not be used because the 
tables should be applied only during the lifetime of the Medicaid recipient. That argument is not 
based on any specific language in the rule and does not make sense. The life estate must be 
valued immediately before death. As explained in In re Estate of Laughead, supra: 
Whether Ruby, "at the time of her death," had an interest in the real property at 
issue here is determined as of a point in time immediately before her death. See In 
re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding ''the phrase 'at the 
time of death' means the time immediately before the Medicaid recipient's 
death"). Immediately prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 acres of 
land. For reasons that follow, we hold her life estate constituted an interest in real 
property within the meaning of section 249A.5(2)( c ). 
In re Estate of Laughead, 696 N. W.2d at 316. Had Melvin Peterson signed a quit-claim deed 
immediately before his death, ceding his life estate interest to Cathie Peterson, the tables found in 
Rule 83 7 would obviously be applied. It makes no sense to say that some other measure should 
be used a few moments later after Melvin Peterson had expired. 
Peterson, for her part, offered no other basis for valuing the life estate, other than to again 
argue that there should be no value at all, in essence inviting the court to ignore section ( 4)(b) 
entirely. This is not a reasonable alternative. In her statement of facts, Peterson implies that the 
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appraiser hired to determine the value of the property would have found the life estate to be 
worth nothing. However, this argument was previously rejected by the court and is disingenuous. 
The fact that there may be no market for a minority interest in property does not mean that the 
minority interest has no value. That is why the partition statutes exist. See Chapter 5, Title 6, 
Idaho Code. Having failed to offer any reasonable alternative valuation of the life estate, 
Peterson should not be permitted to simply object to the reasonable and obvious application of 
the life estate tables in Rule 83 7. 
III. 
THERE IS NO JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE 
Also, yet again, Cathie Peterson challenges the court's subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction. The arguments in this regard have taken on the character of the arguments related to 
how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. The reality is there is no jurisdictional issue 
here. 
Idaho Code § 1-2208(2) assigns probate and estate administration cases to the 
magistrates. This is so irrespective of the value of the estate or its assets. Keeven vs. Estate of 
Keevan, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (App. 1994). Idaho Code§ 15-3-104 gives exclusive 
jurisdiction to this court to determine claims against the decedent and his successors: 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his successors 
may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a personal 
representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and 
actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the procedure 
prescribed by this chapter. 
* * * 
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Idaho Code § 15-3-104 (underline added). Cathie Peterson is, very clearly, a successor to Melvin 
Peterson, as well as an heir. She is Melvin Peterson's daughter and the ordinary successor to the 
remainder interest in the life estate. 
Cathie Peterson wants it both ways. She wants to be treated as a party while she is 
personal representative and has control of the assets of the estate, but she wants to be treated as a 
third party when she doesn't like the outcome. She cites the case of In re Lundy 's Estate, 79 
Idaho 185, 312 P.2d 1028 (1957) for the proposition that a separate action is necessary to 
determine the property rights of a third party. While this may be so, she is not a third party. She 
sought appointment as personal representative of the estate as "the daughter" and one of two 
"sole surviving issue and heirs at law of the decedent." Application for Informal Probate and 
Appointment of a Personal Representative (July 26, 2007). When Cathie Peterson was removed 
as personal representative, the court retained jurisdiction over her. Order Removing Personal 
Representative (October 7, 2010). This order was the subject of an appeal to the District Court 
and was upheld on appeal. Cathie Peterson was given notice of the hearing in which she 
participated. Idaho Code§ 15-3-106 states: 
Subject to general rules concerning the proper location of civil litigation and 
jurisdiction of persons, the court may herein determine any other controversy 
concerning a succession or to which an estate, through a personal representative, 
may be a party. Persons notified are bound though less than all interested persons 
may have been given notice. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-106 (underline added). Cathie Peterson appeared at the evidentiary hearing, 
participated, and offered her own evidence. It cannot be more clear that the court has jurisdiction 
to determine the property rights between the Department and Cathie Peterson relating to the 
assets of this estate, including the life estate. 
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Finally, the underlying hearing was held at the insistence of the District Court, and was 
for the benefit of Cathie Peterson, to permit her to present such evidence and arguments as she 
thought necessary. Tue personal representative could simply have assigned the value of the life 
estate and proceeded to bring a partition action in the District Court. It seems odd that Cathie 
Peterson would object to the jurisdiction of the court to determine issues presented at a hearing 
held for her own benefit. 
DATED this 30th day ofNovember, 2011, 
Deputy Attorney General 
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ATTORNEY FOR CATHIE PETERSON, INDIVIDUALLY BY SPECIAL APPEARANCE 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
·At issue in this case is the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare's ability to 
enforce its statutory lien for Medicaid expenditures against real property currently owned by the 
decedent's daughter Cathie Peterson. FolJowing a remand by the district court for additional 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and an intervening appeal stemming from this court's 
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removal of Ms. Peterson as the personal representative, an evidentiary hearing was conducted on 
September 29, 2011. The parties have submitted their post-trial briefs, and the matter is now 
deemed ripe for the court's determination. 
II. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Melvin Peterson was born on nd died on March 3, 2007 at the age of 83. 
Cathie Peterson is Melvin's adult daughter, and was the personal representative in this probate 
proceeding until being removed by the court following hearing on the State's petition for removal 
on October 7, 2010. 
The vast majority of the facts in this case are not in dispute. On December 6, 2001, Melvin 
gifted ownership of his residential real property to Cathie, reserving to himself a life estate. Cathie 
did not pay fair market value for the remainder interest she received. The deed at issue is 
appropriately titled "Gift Deed", and was recorded as instrument #204218 in Boundary County. 
According to the State's amended claim, Melvin began receiving Medicaid benefits on or 
about March of2003. By the time of his death, Melvin had received a total of $171,386.94 in 
Medicaid benefits. At the hearing on the State's petition for allowance of its claim against the 
estate, the personal representative Cathie Peterson agreed that the State's Medicaid claim was valid 
and should be allowed by the court. The court entered an order allowing the State's claim on April 
14, 2008. 
In May of2008, the State petitioned the court for its order requiring payment of its claim by 
sale of the real property and residence to which Melvin retained a life estate at the time of his death. 
As the current titled owner of that real property, Cathie objected on a variety of grounds, which 
were rejected by the court due to its stated reliance on the reasoning and conclusions set forth by 
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Judge Gaskill in his "Grothe Estate" decisions in Nez Perce County. A copy of those decisions had 
been provided to the court and Cathie Peterson's counsel John Finney by the State's former counsel 
Larry Goins. This court clearly recollects discussion with the parties on the record concerning Judge 
Gaskill's persuasive reasoning and conclusions in the Grothe probate, and its announcement that 
said reasoning was being adopted by the court in this case. 
However, for reasons that remain unclear, none of that discussion appears in the transcripts · 
that were provided to the district court on appeal. Consequently, the district court was unable to 
ascertain this court's rationale for its conclusion that a portion of the real property currently owned 
by Cathie Peterson is subject to the State's Medicaid reimbursement lien. It is aiso noteworthy that 
the State's current counsel, Mr. Cartwright, has advised that the State is no longer maintaining its 
former position that this court can require the sale of Cathie Peterson's real property as an estate 
asset to satisfy its claim. Instead, the State now concedes that this court can only recognize and 
quantify the lien, and the State will then need to file an action for partition (i.e. forced sale) in 
district court to satisfy its Medicaid recovery lien. 
In any event, it is undisputed that Cathie Peterson did not pay anything for the life estate 
remainder interest that her father gifted to her in 2001. Nor is it disputed that Melvin incurred 
$171,386.94 in Medicaid benefits, which the state is entitled by law to recover, and that the estate 
has insufficient funds to pay, absent the inclusion of the value of Cathie's gifted remainder interest 
in the real property. 
The evidence at hearing also convincingly demonstrated that Cathie expended considerable 
sums of money both maintaining and improving the residence at issue after receiving the gift deed 
from her father. There is no testimony or other evidence in the record to show whether and by what 
amount said expenditures increased the fair market value of the residence and real property. 
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III. 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
INCLUSION OF THE LIFE ESTATE AS AN ESTATE ASSET 
The primary issue in this case is whether the gifted life estate remainder interest can be 
included as an estate asset for the limited purpose of satisfying the State's unpaid Medicaid lien, 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 56-218(4). This is the exact issue and argument(s) presented to 
Judge Gaskill in the Grothe Estate. As the court previously advised the parties in 2008, Judge 
Gaskill's reasoning, rationale and conclusions on this exact issue are deemed persuasive and correct 
by this court. A copy of said decisions is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. For the 
reasons set forth therein, the life estate remainder is deemed to be an estate asset for Medicaid 
recovery purposes only, and the court has jurisdiction to establish a lien against the property owned 
by Cathie Peterson. 
B. 
VALUATION OF THE GIFTED REMAINDER INTEREST 
Because the State now concedes that it must enforce its lien in a separate district court 
proceeding against the real property, this court need not quantify the value of that lien in dollars. It 
is sufficient to simply note that IDAPA 16.03.05.837.01 (aka rule 837) shall be applied to the 
undisputed facts to determine the valuation formulae applicable to the gifted life estate remainder 
interest as a matter oflaw. Ms. Peterson's arguments against applying the law (IDAPA) to this case 
are adequately addressed and rejected in Judge GaskilJ's Grothe decision, and his rulings are 
equally applicable here. 
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This lien arose within the context of a probate proceeding. It would therefore seem 
appropriate to utilize the date of death fair market value of the real property, as that is the inventory 
valuation date for all estate assets. See LC. 15-3-706. However, this is a question of law over which 
the presiding district judge in the anticipated partition action will have free review. 
c. 
OFFSETS TO VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY 
Cathie Peterson alleges that the value of the real estate should be reduced or offset due to her 
improvements. The State objects to any offset, reduction, or credit, arguing in its brief that she has 
lived on the property for free since her father's death in March of 2007. The State's position is 
unpersuasive, as it ignores the fact that Cathie is the owner of the property and has the legal right to 
live there "rent free". Certainly, the State's grievance would.never be aired ifthe estate had 
sufficient liquid assets to cover the Medicaid claim. 
To the extent that the State implies that this estate proceeding has been unnecessarily 
prolonged to benefit Ms. Peterson, the State has no one to blame for that circumstance but itself. 
The State's former counsel in particular only sporadically took action to keep this litigation moving 
forward. The petition to remove Ms. Peterson as the personal representative wasn't filed until 
September of 201 O; about two years after it had become apparent that Ms. Peterson and her attorney 
Mr. Finney were pursuing her own individual best interests and not the enumerated responsibilities 
of a personal representative. See LC. 15-3-703, et seq. The State, having sat on its rights and 
contributed to the delay in the administration of this estate for so long, cannot now be heard to argue 
that Ms. Peterson's claimed improvements to the subject property should be ignored by the court. 
Having concluded that equity requires the court to consider the evidence in support of Ms. 
Peterson's claims of improvement, the court must deny those claims for the following reasons. In its 
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brief: the State classifies all of Ms. Peterson's improvements to the property as mere "maintenance". 
While many of her claimed improvements can accurately be so described, others are clearly beyond 
that which can be considered ordinary maintenance. 
For example, the new metal roof, fence, three new fibergla5s and steel doors, and $3,800 for 
new windows are clearly material improvements and not mere maintenance. (Ex. 1) However, there 
is no evidence before the court to demonstrate the enhancement in fair market value to the property 
as a result of said material improvements. The court agrees with the State that where equitable 
contractual relief is sought, the proper measure of unjust enrichment is the increase in value to the 
asset improved, and not the amotmt expended. Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 P.2d 196 (1974) 
In her Responsive Brief, Ms. Peterson argues that she should be given a dollar for dollar 
credit, but fails to quantify the total dollar amount she seeks. No expert witness testimony was 
offered at hearing regarding the resulting enhancement in value to the house. Nor did Cathie 
Peterson, as owner of the property, offer the court her opinion of the property's enhancement in 
value as a result of her improvements and expenditures. Having failed to supply the court with 
sufficient evidence to quantify her claim to enhanced value, the court must decline Ms. Peterson's 
request for a credit or offset. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing shall constitute this court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. This court 
has jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson and the establishment of the State's Medicaid recovery lien 
against the gifted real estate that she owns. The value of the gifted life estate remainder at the time 
of Melvin's death is an estate asset for Medicaid recovery purposes, which will be valuated 
pursuant to IDAPA rule 837. Any necessary partition of the real property asset to enforce the state's 
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lien will be pursued in a separate action in district court. Cathie Peterson has failed to prove 
equitable entitlement to a credit or offset of value for improvements to the property at issue. Mr. 
Cartwright will submit a judgment consistent with the foregoing. 
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OPINION AND ORDER ON 
PETITION FOR INCLUSION 
OF LIFE ESTATElN 
ESTATE INVENTORY 
This matter is before the Court on the State ofldaho, bepartment of Health and Welf~e1s 
(hereinafter ''Depart?Mnf~ Objection to Inventory and Final Account, and Petition t.o Require 
Life Estate to be Included in 1nventory. The Court heard oral aI~ents on the mattei April 19, 
2007 Following arguments, the Court set a status conference in the mattez for May 24t 2907. 
On Mey 29, 2007, the Court 01dered the parties to submit briefing on the invento1y issue by June 
251 2007. The Department is repiesented by attomey W. Corey Cartwright from the State of 
Idaho Attorney General's of:fioe. The Personal Representative o£'1he Estate (hereinafter 
'~state>~ is represented by attorney Erie K. Peterson. The Court, having read the objection and 
petitio.n, the stipulation of fact-:; and the htiefs s-qbmitted by the parti~ having heard 01al 
arguments of counsel~ and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision 
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£.~rna,.,ATEDFAcrSANDPRQCEDURALBACXGROUND 
Lloyd Grothe was bom on January 16, 1909. On August l, 2000, Mr. Grothe was 
granted medical ass.istance through the Medicaid program The program expended not less than 
' . 
$11,197.~l in medical and nursing home care benefits for Ml: Grothe ~ming his eligibility 
period. Lloyd Gro'tbe died on December 25, 20001 survived by his wife, Olive l Grothe, who 
died on September 22, 2001. 
On February 19, 2002 a Medicaid Hen WHS filed with the Secretary of State's office 
against any assetoftheLloydand Olive Grothe estate. Pwsuantto lC. § 56-218(l)and(5), the 
Department has a prio1ity estate claim fox Me(;licaid benefits paid on behalf of Lloyd Grothe. On 
September 20, 2002, the Department filed a Petition fo1 Appointment of Personal Representative 
in the matter of the estate of Lloyd and Olive Grothe. The Petition asserted the Department held 
a valid lien against the estate, that no pers0nal representative had been appointed to probate the 
estate and that the Department sought to assert its claim for Medicaid lien against estate assets, 
in<:;luding real pIOperty located at 1024 :Hemlock in Lewiston, Idaho. 
On September 23, 2007 an Order Appointing Public Administtatot was entered by the 
Court. On Novembel 4, 2002, the Department filed a. Claim Agaipst Estate in the amount of 
$11,197.24 and a Demand foz Notice, serving the same on the administrator. The Department's 
claim was not disallowed and no Notice to Creditors has been published. 
On January 13, 2003, attomey Erio Peterson filed a Resignation of Personal 
Representative and Appointment of Suooesso1 Personal Representative in the abQve~entitled 
probate action. The decedents' son, Gary Grothe, was appointed successor personal 
1epresentative by the Court on January 16, 2003. 
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On July 13, 2006~ the Department filed aPetitioo to Requite Payment of Claim. On 
January 16, :2007, the Medicaid lien against the estate was renewed foi five (5) Yeafi by the 
filing of a renewal with the Sectetaey of State,s office. 
On Ap:ril 2, 2007, the personal representative filed a Petition f'o: Order Approving Charge 
and Disehatge statement, Final Accounting, Final Settlement and Distdbution and a Cba.tge and 
Discharge Statemen4 Final Accounting and Distribution Statement The filed documents listed 
the real p:roperty at issue as having no value and included the notation 44fot disoloSUie purposes 
only- no value listed on property as the property t$ not a probate asset- interest bdbre death was 
a life estat.e ••. not subject to p1obat.e." A hearing on the Petition fox final settlement was 
scheduied fur April 191 200?. However, prior to the hearing date, the Department filed an 
Objection to Inventory and Final Account and Petition to Require Life Estate to be Included in 
Inventory. The objection was raised during the Aprll 19, 2007 heariilg, resulting in the Court 
setting the case for scheduling conference on May 24, 2007. During the scheduling .conference:, 
the Court ordered the parties to file briefs by July 25i 2007 on the issue ofwhetbez the Hfe estate 
is subject to probate as ari asset of the estate. 
The following history is relevant to the issue before the CQurt. On August 16, 1977, 
Lloyd and Olive Grothe. along with their son Gary Grothe, were the gramees of real property 
located at 1024 Hemlock in Lewiston, Idaho The deed provided each of th(3 Gl:othes a one-third 
interest in the property.1 On Februazy 21 1998, Lloyd and Olive Orothe conveyed their interest in 
the real property to Cary and Maria Grothe2 by a deed of gift., but zeserved a life estme in the 
property. 3 On August 11, 20QO, Gaty Gtoiqe, acting as attorriey in fact for Lloyd Grothe, 
1 Bxlu'bit "A" to the Stipulation of Facts :tiled April 19, 2007 
2 Oa:ry. Ol:othe is the son of Lloyd and Olive Oroths Maria Grothe is the wife of Gary Grothe 
:! Bx.bibi1 "B" to the Sttpulation ot:Fac:ts :filed April 19, 2007. 
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conveyed Lloyd's life estate interest in the real property to Olive Grothe. Lloyd Grothe died 
Deceµiber 25, 2000 a:nd Olive G:tothe died September 22, 2001. 
ANALYSIS 
The parties agree that the Department has a vali4 claim for r~vary 9f Medica.id beilefits 
paid on behalf of Lloyd Grothe and that the Deparlment timely filed a claim in the probate 
action 4 1.n dispute is whethe1 the life ema,te interest held by Olive Grothe is an asset that must be 
listed i!i the estate inventory. The Department contends the l\fe esta.te is an asset that must be 
included in the estate inventory as I..C. § 56-218(4) allows the Departtnent to leak to the life 
estate for 1ecovery of expended Medicaid benefits. The Estate takes the position ~ the 
Depart:rncm:t must initiate a separate action outside of the probate proceeding to enfbrce whatever 
rights the Department may have in Iegard to the life estat:e. At~~ are Idaho's pi:obate code 
and Idaho's public assistance code, in particular I.C. § 15·1-201(15)' and I.C § 56-~18(4). The 
issue, which appears to be one of first impression in Idaho, requires the Court to dcte:rmble 
whether the statutory schemes are in conflict or can be reconciled. 
The Estate begins its argument by propoundmg the commqn law principal that when the 
futerest held in teal property is a life estate. upon the dooih of the holder of the li:f'e estaU; title 
and control passes immediately to the remaindern:ia.n. Based on that pi:e.tnlse, the Est.ate contends 
Olive Gtothe's life estate extinguished the moment Olhie Grothe died and, therefore, there is no 
property ~set subject to probate and/or inclusion in the pro'¥e invento:ry. The common law 
4 
'!he personal repesentativ~ states in i:its brlef filed June 25, 2007, pages 3-4: ''Tht State. by virtue of the 
application of' Idaho Code section 56-218, is a secured Cl'editDr of the probate estatt. A funely cteditots claim was 
pra«nted by the Staie and not denied. The $bite, again pmuant to the provisions of Idaho code scctiQJl S6-2 l 8, 
holds a seeurcd hlterest in the ~real property interlst as against the cunent owner of the property " 
s The dcfinitio;Q of 'estme' is cll.rrellt;ly found at IC § 1S·1·201(16) bl.ll was locaud at l C § 15-1-201(15) in .2002. 
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principal espoused by the Estate is correct Nevertheless, the legislature has the power to modify 
the common law. Kirkland v. Blaim County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 4 .P.3d 111 S 
(2000): 6 "Whil~ we recognize that Idaho's info.tmal probate laws encourage ptompt and eff}cient 
settlement of estates> they do ni>tevince a public policy of encouraging_ distribution before estate 
llabtiities have been asC$rfain~d and paid." Hintze v Black, 125 Idaho 655, 659, 873 P. 909 
(Ct.App.1994) [emphaSis added]. 
The Bstat~ while impliedly conceding the life estat;e may have value in the context of 
IC § 56-218, cont.ends the life estate interest held by Olive Gtothe falls outside the probate code 
de:finitiop. of estate, making it a non·probate asset not sul}ject to incl~ion in the probate 
inv~tory. Idaho's ptob~e code deflnes 'estate' as follows: 
"Estate" means all property of the deceden~ including community property of the r 
survi'1ing spouse subject to administration, property of tnists, and property of any 
other person whose affairs ate subject to this code as it exists from tiine to time 
during admmisttation. 
I.C § 15·1·201(15). 
The Estate concedes Idaho's public assist.$.tice law specifically includes a life est.ate as an 
estate asset for puzposes of recovery Of Medicaid benefits, but contends the De.Pattm.ent must 
bring an action outside of the probat.e proceedings ro assert its rights. The relevant public 
assistance law reads as follows: 
For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All zeal and personal property and other assets included wit.bin the 
individual's estate, as defined for pwposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and ~ther assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such 
interest), including sucli assets conveyed to a surviv01:1 hei:r, or assign of the 
6 ~.use it is proper~ within the power of the legislatme to emblisli statutes of':limitil.tions, statutes of~,. 
create new causes of action. and otn«rw.ise 1llOdify tbe common Jaw without violating separation of powers 
principle&, it necessarily follows t1vn the legisla.mre also bas the p<1'iV6l to limtt remedies ava.ilahle to plaintiffs 
without vio.l.Wng the separation of power$ doctrine" Kirkl.fJl'Ji.v Blaine Cl1flntj Medical Center, 134 Idaho at 471 
in the Mtmet qj IN &late of Grothb 
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deceased individual through joint tenancy, tanancy in common. survivorship, life 
est.ate, living ·ttust or other m:rangement 
l.C: § 56-218(4). 
Tlie question raised iri the instant matter requires the Court to engage in ~tutory · · 
inteipletation and c6.nstruction in orde:t to determine whetbt.r I.C. § 15.:"1-201 (15) and I.C. § ·56-
218(4) are in conflict; can be I'e!Xlnciled, or if one statute controls over the other. 
Interpretation of a statute begins with an ~tion of the statllte's lite:tal words. 
State v Bumight; 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the 
language of a statute is plain ~ UDambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as 
wri~ without engaging in statutory construction State v. Rhoil8, 133 Idaho 
459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999)i State v Etcobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 
65, 67 (Ct.App.2000). If a court must engage in statutory construction, then its 
duty·is to~ and give effect to the intent of the legislatme. Bwd; 135 
Idaho at 646,, 22 P.3d at 121. In so doing, we look to the context of the st.aiutory 
language in question and·the public policy behind the smti.tte. State v. Cw:ld, 137 
Idaho 625, 627, 51 P.3d 439, 441 (Ct.App 2002) .. When an ambiguous statute is 
part of a larger sta:tuto:ry scheine, we not only focus upon the langU.age of the 
ambiguous statute, but also look at other~ relating to the same subject 
matt« and consider them together in 0rder t.o discern ie~slative ~t ~ale v. 
Pactorek, 137 Idaho 629, 6~2, 51P.3d443,446 (CtApp.2002). 
State v Shanb, 139 Idaho 152, 154, 7.5 P.3d 206 (Ct.App.2003). 
Tue Court has traditionally used a two-st.ep approach tQ l~gislati:ve int.etpletatiOri.. 
"We interpret statutes according to the plain, express meaning of a provision iri 
question. and we will ~sort to judicial construction only if the pro-vision is 
ambiguous, incomplet.e, absurd, or arguably in conflict Y.litb other laws.'' Pea1ley 
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 1n 742, 979 P.2d 605, 615 (1999). 
Sandpoint Indeperuisnt Highway District v. Board of County Commissioners, i38 Idaho 887, 
890, 71P.3d1034 (200~). 
The language in LC. § 56-218( 4) is plain and unambiguous. For purposes of Medicaid 
benefits recovery, the de:furl:tion of 'estate' has been expanded by the Idaho legislature to include 
a life estate interest in real property'. Yet, the expanded language has not been added to the 
definition of estate in the probate code. Nevertheless. Idaho Code§ 1.5-1-201(15) includes 
1 Addcd.PUtSUMt to 42 U.S C.A § l396p(b)(4)(B) 
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'catclHll' language that reads, " .. and property of any other pe:rso11 whose affairs are subject to 
this code as it exists :from time to time during arlministration." 
In comparing the two statutes, it is evident they relat.e to ili;e same subje~ -the 
composition of the 'estate' of a deceased individual~ making the statut_eB in pari materia. 
Statutes axe in pari material if they xelate to the same subject. Grand C(lll)Jon 
Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho l, 855 P.2d 462 (1993). Such 
statutes are cons!Iued together to effect legislative intent Id. Where two statutes 
appear to apply to the same case or subject matter, the specific statute will control 
over the more geneial statute. State v 1James1 133 Idaho ~78, 987 P.2d 290 
(1999) 
Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201 1 204, 46 P. 3d 18 (2002) 
The probate ·oode specifically states, "This code shall be liberally consttued and applied 
to promote its undetlying purposes and policies." I.C. § l5-1-102(a). The Code then provides: 
The underlying purposes and policies of this oode are: 
(1) to $nplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents1 missing 
persons, protected persons, mmors and incapacitated pezsons; 
(2) to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distn'bution oflrls 
property; 
(3) t.o promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the 
decedent and making distribution to his suooessors; 
(4) to :facilitate use and enforcem.ent of eertain trust'si 
(5) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
!.C. § 15-1-102(b); See a]s() In re Estate of Elliott, 141Idaho177,.181, 108 P .3d 324 (2005). 
When I.C. § 15-1-201(15) andI.C. § 56-218(4) are considered togethei, along with the 
underlying pmposes and policies of the probate oode, and the code is liberally construed and 
applied to promote those purposes and policies, the intent of the legislature becomes clear. By 
expanding the definition of 'estate' in I.C. § 56·218, it is clear the legislature intended issues 
regarding recovery of public assistance medical bena to be addressed in the probate piocess.' 
'While the issue Wore tbt Conrt inl:n te Ert¢e ef Jaakmim, 132 ldaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) was clistinguis.bable 
from tbe.iss'l.lt before this Court. .tb.e Sup.rmie Court in JtJ.Ckmaii had no dift'lculty teeoneiling 42 US .c. § 1396p, 
now codified at I C. § S6-2l8, with Idaho's ptobate code, and in particul!ll· with IC. § lS.-1·201(15). 
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However. because the expanded definition is applicable only fot the limited issue of public 
assist.a.nee recovery, it would have been error to add the same language to the probate code. To 
do so would have created a geneial expansion that would have allowed all credit.ors to look to the 
eXpanded assets for recovery. Su.ch was clearly not the intetrt of the ~lature nor was it 
necessary. 
By expanding the assets tha\ can be reaobed for the limited purpose of rerovery of 
Medicaid benefits, the legislature cteated a. specific statuta that conttols over the moie general 
probate statute. Such a scheme is consistent witbi and fa.I.ls within the language of, I.C. § 15· 1 • 
201 (15), as it allows into the probate proceedings "property of any other petson whose affairs are 
subject to this code as it exists from time to time du.r.ing administration"" Questions relative to a 
life estate and the property interest of a remaindenna.n fall squarely within this language. Those 
questions, such as detexm:ining the value of a particular life estate the mo~mt 1'efore death 
occur.re~ do not change whether asked within the confines of a probate proceecling or in a 
separate action and the questions are as amenable to being answered in a p.robe.te proceeding as 
they would be in a separate proceeding.9 
The pwpose of proba.t.e proceedings is to pro'Vide an effec#ve and efficient process in 
which to resolve !Ill creditors, claims and f)S&et dis1ribution issues as they telate to a deceased 
individual. This pmpose can only be effectuated wbtn the probate code is hoerally construed 
and applied so that the underlying purposes and policies att attained. That includes addressing 
those assets the legislature declared to be estate assets for th~ limited purpose of a claim fur 
9 The Est.at.a in the instant cut directs the Cowt to the langilage fbund m I C. § SC..21 S(S) that reads, "A1rt 
distnbution or ~ of the estate prior to swzymg such olaim is voidable and lll4Y be set asi~ by an action in ti» 
district court " the :Estate asserts this language mipports its ]lO£ifuJn that the Pepartment mwt brhlg a separate 
action to Je<:OVC'if against the }ife estate intertst Of 0~ Grothe. The Cowt is not pmwaded. Whmi the language is 
l1ad ln c-<>ntcxt with tha entire code seation, it is evident the lll1lgllflge :is dit•• at the procedural means thr 
challenging the dism1mtion of an asset by the pe:tl!Oll appointed within the probate prooeeding to adm.inistm the 
estate The language is not directed at a challenge to the propez eompc$itioD of the esiate. 
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recovery of Medicaid benefits. Contrary to the atguments of the Estate. LC. § 15-3-709 declares 
it the duty and responsibility of the person.al representative to take control and/or possession of 
all potential as.sets of the estate, whether or not title is disputed, so that propt;r administratio~ of 
the estate may he accomplished, which includes addresfilng ~ claims against the estate along 
with the Qistribution of assets 
ORD EB 
Itis h+iebythe Order of the Court that, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-1-201(15) and Idaho 
Code § 56~218(4), the life estate held by Olive Gtothe prior to her death~~ be included in the 
estate inventory and a value de~ed ~ attributed to the life estate real property interest for 
the limited purpose of satisfying, in pait or in whole, the State ofidaho, Department of Health 
and Welfute's valid and timely filed claim for recovery of Medicaid benefits r~eived by Lloyd 
Grothe. 
in thQ }41'JJ111 ef tbs .F.tlt:U cf GMtlw 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
lN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
) 
OLIVE J. GROTHE and LLOYD GROTH, ) 
husband and wi f c, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV02-02163 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
APPROVAL OF CHARGE AND 
DISCHARGE STATEMENT, FINAL 
ACCOUNTING, FINAL SETTLE-
MENT AND DISTRIBUTION 
This matter is before the Court on the Amended Petition for Order Approving Charge and 
Discharge Statement, Final Accounting, Final Settlement and Distribution filed by the Personal 
Representative of the Estate and on the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's Second 
Objection to Inventory and Final Account and Petition to Establish Value of Life Estate. The 
Court heard oral arguments on the matters March 20, 2008. The Department of Health and 
Welfare is represented by attorney W. Corey Cartwright from the State of Idaho Attorney 
General's office. The Personal Representative of the Estate is represented by attorney Eric K. 
Peterson. The Court_, having read the Petition of the Estate, the Objection and Petition of the 
Department, the briefs submitted by the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and 
being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 8, 1977, Lloyd and Olive Grothe, along with their son Gary, purchased the 
real property at issue. The deed provided that Lloyd, Olive and Gary each held a one-third 
interest in the real property. On February 2, 1998, \vhile reserving a Life Estate interest in the 
real property, Lloyd and Olive Grothe executed a Gift Deed wherein they each conveyed their 
one-third interest in the real property to their son, Gary Grothe, and his wife Maria. 
Lloyd Grothe applied for and was approved to receive Medicaid benefits effective August 
1, 2000. On August 10, 2000, Lloyd Grothe was granted Medicaid benefits for nursing home 
care. On August 11, 2000, Lloyd Grothe deeded his life estate interest in the real property to his 
wife, Olive. From August 1, 2000 until his death on December 25, 2000, Lloyd Grothe received 
$11, 197.21 in Medicaid medical and nursing home benefits. Olive Grothe died September 22, 
2001. In 2001, the value oftl1e real property at issue was assessed at $110,830.00. On February 
19, 2002, Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("Department") tiled a Medicaid lien against 
any real or personal property of the Lloyd and Olive Grothe Estate. 1 
On September 20, 2002, the Department initiated the above-entitled matter by filing a 
Petition for Appointment of Personal Representative. An Order Appointing Public 
Administrator was entered by the Court on September 23, 2002. The Department then filed a 
Claim Against Estate and Demand for Notice on November 4, 2002. The Department's claim 
sought payment for Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of Lloyd J. Grothe in the amount of 
$11,197.21 pursuant to LC.§§ 56-218(1) and (5). 
1 The Medicaid line was renewed for an additional five (5) years on January 16, 2007. 
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On January 14, 2003, a Resignation of Personal Representative and Appointment of 
Successor Personal Representative was filed. Gary W. Grothe2 was subsequently appointed as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Grothe ("Estate"). On January 30, 2003, the Estate filed 
a Petition for Exempt Property Allowance in the amount of $10,000.00 pursuant to LC. § 15-2-
403. No furlher action occurred in the case until July 13, 2006. when the Department filed a 
Petition to Require Payment of Claim. On April 2, 2007, the Estate filed an Inventory, a Charge 
and Discharge Statement, Final Accounting and Distribution Statement and a Notice of Ilearing. 
The real property of the Estate was omitted from the inventory. When the Estate filed its Pinal 
Accounting. the real prope11y asset was valued at zero (0), noting that the Estate held only a life 
estate interest in the real property and further noting there would be no payment on the claim 
filed by the Department. 
On April 4, 2007, the Department filed an Objection to Inventory and Final Account, and 
Petition to Require Life Estate to be Included in Inventory. On April 19, 2007. the Court heard 
oral arguments of counsel on the issue of whether the life estate interest must be included in the 
Estate inventory and whether the Department's lien and claim against the life estate was properly 
brought in the probate action. Following oral arguments, the Court allO\-ved the parties the 
opportunity to present briefs on the issue. On August 9, 2007, the Court entered its Opinion and 
Order on Petition for Inclusion of Life Estate in Estate Inventory. "vherein the Court held that the 
life estate interest in the real property was an asset that must be valued and included in the 
probate inventory for the limited purpose of Medicaid recovery. 
2 Gary Grothe was the only child of Olive and Lloyd Grothe and was named as the personal represented in the Last 
Will and Testament of Olive Grothe, which was filed with the Court after the above-entitled action was initiated by 
the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. Olive Grothe had two other children from a prior marriage, both of 
which were named in Olive Grothe's Last Will and Testament. 
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On February 29, 2008, the Estate filed an Amended Inventory, an Amended Charge and 
Discharge Statement, Final Accounting and Distribution Statement, Amended Petition for Order 
Approving Charge and Discharge Statement, Final Accounting, Final Settlement and 
Distribution and requested the Court set the matter for hearing. The amended documents listed 
the life estate interest in the Estate inventory, as previously ordered by the Court, but valued lhe 
asset at zero (0). On March 6, 2008, the Department filed a Second Objection to Inventory and 
Final Account and Petition to Establish Value of Life Estate, Memorandum in Support of Second 
Objection and Petilion, and a Notice of Hearing. The Court took the matter under advisement 
after hearing oral arguments of counsel on March 20, 2008. 
Before the Court was able to enter its written ruling, additional filings were submitted by 
the parties. On March 26, 2008, the Estate filed a Brief re Supplement to Amended Charge and 
Discharge Statement, Final Accounting and Distribution Statement. The Estate's supplemental 
brief indicated the personal representative's intent lo abandon the life estate asset pursuant to LC. 
§ 15-3-902 and asserted the asset was, therefore, no longer subject to the probate proceedings. 
On March 31, 2008. the Department filed a Motion to Strike, asserting th<: Estate's 'new' 
position was untimely under J.C.§ 15-1-401 and I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) and sought to insert new issues 
into a matter already pending before the Court. On March 31, 2008, the Estate filed a Response 
to Motion to Strike, asserting J.C. § 15-3-715(11) did not require the personal representative to 
seek court approval to abandon the asset and that the action was not one thal required a hearing. 
On April 2, 2008, the Estate filed a request for Judicial Notice of an unrelated Medicaid recovery 
case, designated as Nez Perce County Case No. CV2007-01416. 
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ANALYSIS 
The Court finds it necessary to deal first with the post hearing filings of the parties. After 
the hearing. but before the Court could enter its written ruling regarding the issue of value to be 
attached to the lite estate, the Personal Representative notified the Department that the lifo estate 
asset was being abandoned pursuant to l.C. § 15-3-715( 11 ), thus taking the life estate out of the 
probate proceedings. The Estate contends it has the authority to abandon the asset and need not 
seek approval from the Court before doing so. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-715(11) reads: 
Except as restricted or otherwise provided by the will or by an order in a formal 
proceeding and subject to the priorities stated in section 15-3-902 of this code, a 
personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons, 
may properly: 
( 11) Abandon property when, in the opinion of the personal representative, it is 
valueless, or is so encumbered, or is in condition that it is of no benefit to the 
estate; 
In the instant matter, the Personal Representative is without authority to abandon the life 
estate asset. On August 9, 2007, the Court ordered that the life estate asset be included in the 
Estate inventory and ordered that it be valued for purposes of the Department's claim for 
Medicaid recovery. Once the Court issued its Order, the authority of the Personal Representative 
to abandon the a..%ct was lost. The statute states in clear and unambiguous terms, "Except as 
restricted or othcnvisc provide by the will or by an order in a formal proceeding .... " I.C. § 15-
3-715. (emphasis added). 
As a further note, the Court is at a loss to understand the purpose behind the Estate's 
Judicial Notice filing. The Court recognizes the Department's right to foreclose on its lien by 
means of a separate action when no probate has been filed, as occw-red in the case cited by the 
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Estate in its judicial notice filing. 3 However, the instant case is distinguishable. Tlere, a probate 
proceeding was filed. A probate proceeding is a proper avenue for the filing of a Medicaid 
recovery claim. eliminating the need for a separate recovery claim action.4 Therefore, the Court 
finds the case cited in the Estate's Judicial Notice to be inapplicable to the instant matter. 
The primary matter before the Court is what, if any, value should be attributed to the Iifo 
estate asset of the Estate. The Estate, despite the Court's earlier analysis, continues to argue 
common law rules regarding life estates. As discussed by the Court in its earlier decision, 
Congress and state legislatures have the power to modify the common law. Thal is precisely 
what Congress and many States, including Idaho, did when they enacted Medicaid recovery 
statutes and, in particular, amended those statutes to expand the definition of "estate" to include 
various real property interests that may be subject to Medicaid recovery. 
The Medicaid program was created in 1965 when Congress passed amendments to the 
Social Security Act authorizing states to set up comprehensive plans for supplying medical 
services to indigents and provided for states Lo receive matching federal funds for the programs. 
West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. DH.HS, 132 F.Supp.2d 437 (S.D.W.Va2001). To qualify for 
Medicaid benefits, applicants must show they are aged, blind, disabled or the parent of a minor 
child and that their income and resources are insufiicient to meet the <.:osts of neces~ary care and 
services. Id. The eligibility determination allows applicants to exclude the value of their home 
for purposes of eligibility only. The home value exclusion thus allows persons with a potentially 
valuable asset to receive benefits along with those who have greater financial need. Id. at 440. 
Congress addressed this anomaly through estate recovery." Id at 440 
3 The Estate asks the Court to take judicial notice ofNe:z Perce County Case No. CV07-014 J 6. The proceedings in 
that case arc clearly distinguishable as no probate was ever filed following the death oftbe estate holder and the case 
was dismissed after the Department recovered its Medicaid claim from the estate. 
4 The propriety of Medicaid recovery within the probate proceeding was addressed in the Court's earlier decision 
and, therefore, will not be addressed here. 
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In 1993, "Congress passed the estate recovery provision as part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 to counterbalance rocketing Medicaid expenditures and overall 
budget and deficit reductions.'' Id. at 440. Under the 1993 provision, Congress requires states to 
recoup benefits from the estates of certain Medicaid recipients as a condition to receiving 
Medicaid fonds, while still allowing states to provide for recipients to retain their home during 
their lifetime,. Id. at 440. Persons subject to estate recovery arc given notice of the recovery 
requirement and. therefore, accept or reject Medicaid long-term benefits with full knowledge that 
their home may one day he subject to a recovery claim. Id. States that fail to participate in estate 
recovery risk losing all or part of their Medicaid funding. Id. 
J\s articulated by the Supreme Court of Nevada, estate recovery acts encompass two 
important policy considerations. 
First, the government has a legitimate statutory interest in recovering the amount 
of correctly paid Medicaid benefits from a deceased Medicaid recipient's estate, 
which includes the recipient's ownership interest in property at the time of death. 
This interest arises from foderal legislation mandating that states establish an 
estate recovery program in order to receive federal Medicaid funding. Estate 
recovery provisions were initiated in light of increased demands for Medicaid, 
which stemmed from the growth of the nation's aging population. Congress was 
concerned with projections indicating that Medicaid funding will be insufficient 
to meet claims within the next thirty years. The federal statutes not only 
condition the states' receipt of Medicaid fonding on efforts seeking recovery from 
a deceased recipient's probate estate, but they also permit states to expimd the 
definition of "estate" to include property held in joint tenancy and various other 
ownership interests at the time of death. 
However, the federal and state statutes also reflect concem for the second policy 
consideration, avoiding spousal impoverishment. Congress has Jong been 
concerned with preventing spousal impoverishment. The legislation attempts to 
strike a balance between these policies by limiting reimbursement efforts to 
situations where impoverishment is no longer an issue. The foremost 
consideration is enabling states to help more people in need of Medicaid get 
assistance. 
State ofNevada Department of Human Resources v. Ulmer, 87 P.3d 1045, 120 Nev. 108 
(Nev.2004). 
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The Medicaid program is structured so that an individual does not have to fall into 
poverty before help is available. If eligible, an individual may 'postpone' his or her financial 
obligation to pay for medical care until the recipient's assets are no longer needed by the 
recipient or the recipient's spouse. Medicaid is intended to act as a safety net not a free ride. 
Medicaid is not an avenue by which one can shift his or her financial burden for medical care to 
the American taxpayer, while a recipient's heirs enjoy a financial windfall. In the instant malter. 
the Court finds the Estate's efforts to avoid paying the Department's Medicaid recovery claim 
untenable. Medicaid benefits \.Vere not forced upon the Grothcs. Rather, they made an election 
to receive Medicaid benefits and it is the receipt of those benefits that gives rise to the repayment 
obligation. 
In providing for the expanded definition of "estate", Congress sought to close the 
loophole crafted by Medicaid recipients seeking to divest the program of much needed tax 
dollars while still preserving assets for the benefit of the recipient's heirs. Contrary to the 
continued argwnents of the Estate, common law rules of law are not applicable to the issue 
before the Court as the common law has been modified by federal and state lawmakers. Hy 
adding the real property interest known as a life estate to the Medicaid recovery statutes, 
lawmakers intended a value to be attributed to the asset and for the value be subject to Medicaid 
recovery claims. To interpret the statute any other way would defy logic and render the statute 
meaningless. Therefore, the Court finds the lite estate must be attributed a value of $39,796.83, 
as calculated by the Department based on IDAPA 16.03.05.837. The life estate interest and its 
corresponding value must be included in the Estate inventory and must be recognized as an asset 
available for payment of the Department's Medica1d recovery claim. 
In the Matter of Grothe 
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ORDER 
The Petition for Order Approving Charge and Discharge Statement, Final Accounting, 
Final settlement and Distribution filed by the Personal Representative of the Estate is hereby 
DENIED. 
It is the further Order of the Court that the Life Estate Interest may not be abandoned by 
the Personal Representative of the Estate and that Petitioner must attribute a value of $39, 796.83 
to the Life Estate for purposes of payment of the Department's Medicaid Recovery claim. 
In the Matter ({(Grothe 
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United States of America 
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ORDER RE: VALUE OF ESTATE 
INTEREST 
An evidentiary hearing on all remaining issues in this estate having been held on 
September 29, 2011, Cathie Peterson appearing individually through her attorney, Brent C. 
Featherston, Attorney at Law, and Cathie Peterson also appearing through John A. Finney, 
Attorney at Law, representing her interests as former personal representative of this estate, and 
the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the Department or state), appearing 
through W. Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, and the court having received written 
closing arguments and legal memoranda, and having issued its Memorandum Opinion, filed 
December 22, 2011, 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. The court's Memorandum Opinion shall constitute its findings of facts and 
conclusions of law herein; 
2. The value of the estate's interest in the real property gift deeded to Cathie Peterson, as 
recorded in instrument #204218 in Boundary County, shall be that proportion of the fair market 
value of the entire fee interest in the real property, to wit: 
ORDER RE: VALUE OF ESTATE INTEREST - 1 
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Tax #5, being part of Lot Five (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Springs Townsite and described as 
follows: 
Commencing at the Northeast Corner of Lot Five (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Springs Townsite; 
thence West along the North Line of Lot Five (5), a distance of 40 feet to a point; thence 
Southwesterly along Moyie Street a distance of 140 feet to a point; thence South 63 feet to a 
point; thence East 95 feet at a point on the East line of Lot 5; thence North 125 feet to the 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
as calculated by the reference tables set forth in IDAPA 16.03.05.837, and the Department shall 
have a lien upon said property for such value; 
3. Cathie Peterson is not entitled to any credit or offset for sums expended to maintain or 
improve the real property while in her possession; 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that any necessary partition of the real property 
asset to enforce the state's lien shall be purs 
ta 
ENTERED this / 0 day 0£ anuary, 2012, 
ourt. 
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postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
Attorneys at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
John A. Finney 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
W. Corey Cartwright 
Deputy Attorney General 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83 720-0009 
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CASE NO. CV-2007-00266 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, 
AND THE RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, 
DEPUTY ATTOR..t~EY GENERAL AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT Cathie Peterson, individually, herein 
APPELLANT, appeals pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 and Idaho Code§ 17-201, as follows: 
1. The title of the court from which the appeal is taken is the Magistrate Division of 
the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of 
Boundary, Magistrate Judge Justin W. Julian, presiding. 
2. The title of the Court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State ofldaho in a...11d for the County of Boundary. 
3. The date and heading of the judgment or decision from which the appeal is taken 
is the Order Re: Value of Estate Interest, entered January 10, 2012. 
4. The appeal is taken upon both matters of law and matters of fact. 
5. The testimony and proceedings of the original trial or hearing were recorded by 
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!Brent C. Jeat/ierston* 
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the Boundary County Clerk and are in the possession of the Boundary County Clerk The 
proceedings resulting in the Order were held on September 29, 2011 . 
6. The issues on appeal upon which the Appellant intends to assert in the appeal 
(but such list is not an exhaustive list), and provided that any such list of issues on appeal shall 
not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal thereafter discovered by the 
Appellant is as follows: 
a. Did the Magistrate err in the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
contained in its Memorandum Opinion. 
b. Did the Magistrate err in its valuation of the Estate's interest in real 
property owned by Cathie Peterson and described in the Order Re: Value of Estate's Interest and 
placing a lien upon said property in favor of the State. 
c. Did the Magistrate err in determining that it had jurisdiction to issue its 
Order Re: Value of Estate's Interest. 
d. Did the Magistrate err in finding that Cathie Peterson was not entitled to 
any credit or offset 
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2012. 
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I. PROCEDURAL IllSTORV 
This matter began with a Petition for Infonnal Probate of the estate of Melvin Peterson 
("Estate'). Cathie Peterson, the decedent's daughter (''Cathie"), was appointed Personal 
Representative on July 26, 2007. The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare ("State") 
filed its creditor claim ec1aim") against the estate on November 30> 2007 for reimbursement of 
Medicaid funds paid on Melvin Peterson's ("Melvin'') behalf during his lifetime. The Claim was 
disallowed by the Estate with a request for itemization on November 30~ 2007. The State filed an 
"Amended Claim" shortly after which was also disallowed. The State filed its Petition for 
Allowance of the Amended Claim which was heard and granted by the court on March 25, 2008. 
On May 5, 2008, the State filed a Petition to Require payment of the Claim seeking 
payment of $171,386.94 of Medicaid benefits paid during Melvin's lifetime. At the hearing on 
June 12th, the Court ordered the payment of the State's Claim and further finding that the Melvin's 
life estate reserved a "Gift Deed'' to Cathie dated December 6, 2001, be deemed an asset of the 
estate for purposes of the State recovering its Claim. The Trial Court ordered Cathie to pay the 
Claim from these assets. 
On August 6, 2008, the Personal Representative filed a Motion to Hire Appraiser. The 
State objected and the Court agreed to the extent that the Estate was pennitted to only hire an 
appraiser to value the fee title of Cathie's home, not the life estate retained by Melvin as of the date 
of his death. The State also filed a Motion to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department, 
which the Court granted. The Estate appealed these rulings to the District Court. The District 
Court reversed the Trial Court and remanded on May 25, 2010. 
APPELLANT'S :inmiF - l 
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Based upon the State's actions to sell Cathie's home, Cathie, individually, filed a Demand 
for Notice and Special Appearance on September 17, 2010, reserving issues of jurisdiction, venue. 
service of process, and due process. Concurrently, Cathie filed a Motion of Automatic 
Disqualification under ffi.CP Rule 40 (d)(l). The trial Court denied the motion to disqualify. The 
State objected and moved to strike Cathie's special appearance, which was denied. The State 
Petitioned for the removal of Cathie as Personal Representative. The Trial Court granted the 
petition and appointed the State as Successor Person Representative, citing, in part, Cathie's 
conflict of interest evidenced by her special appearance through separate counsel. The Estate 
appealed this ruling to the District Court. The District Court affinned. 
On remand, the State, the Trial Court set the matter for "Court trial" on September 29, 
2011. The State, as successor personal representative, did not file any pleadings or notices of what 
claims. issues or other matters were to be detemrined or tried. Rather, the State proceeded at the 
date of ti-ial, to present the testimony of Cathie and then submitted the Personal Representative's 
Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court set a briefing schedule and 
subsequently issued a Memorandum Opinion on December 22, 2011 directing the State to prepare 
and present an appropriate judgment. The Trial court entered an Order Re: Value of Estate Interest 
on January 10, 2012. Cathie filed her Notice of Appeal February 6, 2012. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 2 
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U. STATEMENTOFFACTS 
On March 26, 1997, Melvin, together with a third party, Alicia Whitman, took title to a 
home and property in Moyie Springsi Idaho. The testimony at trial established the home was in 
very poor condition with foundation and structural deficiencies. On December 5, 2001, Melvin 
conveyed all ownership ro Cathie by deed with the following language included: '•RESERVING 
UNTO GRANTOR A LIFE ESTATE IN SAID PROPERTY". Ex. A. 
Cathie testified that by this time she resided in the home and was caregiver for her father. 
Cathie expended over $3,000.00 of her own money in making improvements to her very modest 
home :from December, 2001, until the State asserted a claim to the property in this proceeding. In 
late 2002, Cathie and Melvin filed suit to clear title :from Alicia Whitman 
Melvin applied for and received Medicaid benefits begiru:ring several years after deeding the 
home to Cathie. The record contains no indication that the State disqualified or penalized Melvin 
as a result of his life estate. 
Upon Melvin's death on March 3, 2007, the Court appointed Cathie as Personal 
Representative of the Estate. As Personal Representative, Cathie filed an inventory of the Melvin 
Peterson Estate. Upon the Court's Order to do so, Cathie included in the inventory of the Estate of 
Melvin Peterson, the "life estate" at a zero value. 
The State's positiOll in this litigation is well summarized by its objection to the Estate's 
motion to hire an appraiser. The State asserts that an appraiser is not "qualified to provide such 
opinion evidence because he is not an actuary or a person otherwise possessed with specialized 
k110wledge of life expectancies". The State's position at Trial in September (and as early as 2008 
when the Estate proposed to hire an appraiser) is that the appropriate valuation of Melvin is life 
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estate is to determine fair market value of the fee ownership of and then to apply the "life estate 
table contained in LD.AP.A. § 16.03.05.837.02 ... in order to properly determine the actual value 
of the life estate interest." 
The Department has been intent on using the I.D.A.P.A. Table from the beginning, refusing 
to permit a qualified opinion of value. 
Cathie has !!£m been joined in this action as an individual by virtue of any service of 
process or appropriate notice to her of the State's intent to sell the property that is her home.1 By 
virtue of her position as the prior personal representative, she became aware that the State of Idaho 
intended to force the sale of her residence and home and appeared by special appearance without 
waiving these jurisdiction and due process issues. 
At trial in September, 2011, the State presented no evidence as to the value of the real 
property or life estate in question and sought a ruling that the Estate is owner of a 38~642% interest 
in Cathie's home. Closing Brief, p.6. 
The Trial Court agreed and entered :findmgs pursuant to I.C. § 56-218 and I.D.A.P.A. Rule 
837, accordingly. 
1 The State's Motion to Sell Cathie's home was never served upon Cathie) individually. Cathie 
has participated since September, 2010, only pursmmt to a Special Appearance. 
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. " 
ID. ARGUMENT 
For purposes of clarity, it may be helpful to be reminded of the legal nature of the interests 
created by the Gift Deed from Melvin to Cathie. 
Fee simple absolute title by a grantor can be split during the 
conveyance into a present estate and a future estate. The most 
common present estate is the life estate. The creation of the life 
estate usually involves words indicating that the possession is for 
life or some similar limitation .... without language giving the life 
estate O\vner the right to dispose of the property; the future interest 
cannot be conveyed by the life estate owner ..... there are two types 
of future estates associated with the life estate. These are the 
reversion and the remainder . . . . A remainder is used when the 
grantor wants to convey ownership of the future interest to a third 
party. 
121Am.Jur.-ProofofFacts3d, 101 (2011). 
It appears that Melvin conveyed all future interest in the property, a vested remainder 
interest, to Cathie subject only to his reserved present interest, a life estate. As indicated above, 
Melvin lost all right to that future interest conveyed to Cathie, upon execution and delivery of the 
Gift Deed in 2001. His only reserved present interest was the life estate. The question raised on 
this appeal is whether the life estate was properly included by the Trial Court in Melvin's estate for 
purposes of satisfying the State's claim. 
A. Idaho Code § 56-218 does not apply in these circumstances. 
The Trial Court~s Memorandum Opinion asserts that "[t]he primacy issue in this case is 
whether the gifted life estate remainder interest can be included as an estate asset .... pursuant to 
LC. § 56~218(4). Memorandum Opinion, p.4. 
2 The Trial Court does not explain or define this tel'II1 and it appears to misstate the legal 
property interests that are at issue in this matter. Melvin reserved to himself a "life estate" but 
granted the "remainder interest" to Cathie. 
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The Trial Court ruled that Melvin's life estate is included as an estate asset that is subject to 
Medicaid recovery, and references the Second District Magistrate Oaskill's decision in Jhe Matter 
of the Estate of Grothe. It appears that the Department's position is that this definition of estate 
assets overrides the common law or Probate Code by including life estates as an asset of the 
decedent at death. 
1. Language ofldaho Code §56-218 
"Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the 
language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and 
appropriate meaning in law, or En'e defined in the succeeding section, are to be construed 
according to such peculiar a:nd appropriate meaning or definition/' Idaho Code Ann. § 73-113 
(2012). 
The succeeding section provides definitions as follows: 
( d) "Property" includes both real and personal property; 
( e) "Real property" is coextensive with lands, tenements 
and hereditaments, possessory rights and claims. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 73-114 (2012) 
The plain language of the statute at issue was misread by the Trial Court to require the 
inclusion of Melvin's life estate. 
For purposes of this section. the tenn "estate" shall include: 
(a) all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defmed for purposes of 
state probate law; and 
(b) any other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time 
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of death, to the extent of such interest, including such assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased 
individual tllrough joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
I.C. § 56-218(4)(2011) 
[emphasis added] 
a. Subsection (b) does not include Melvin's reserved lite estate. 
TI1e Trial Court appears to rely in error upon subsection (b ). The statute does not state that 
a decedent's life estate is included in his estate. Rather, it seeks to include in the estate, for 
recovery purposes, assets in which the decedent held a legal interest "at the time of death, to the 
extent of such interest". The statute goes on to specifically identify as assets of the estate "such 
assets conveyed (by decedent] to a survivor ... through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement." Subsection b makes no mention of 
including a life estate "retained" by the decedant., only a life estate or other interest that has been 
conveyed to a "survivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual;'. 
To explain, I.C. §56-218(4)(b) recognizes that Melvin could have conveyed his property to 
his daughter for his lifetime. That life estate to Cathie would leave a future reversion interest after 
Melvin's death. The statute insures that that remainder interest must revert back to Melvin's estate 
at his death. The statute insures that that interest must be included in the estate for Medicaid 
recovery purposes. Likewise, a conveyance by Melvin to Cathie in joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common or with right of survivorship, would req\lUe that the estate recover that interest to Melvin's 
estate for Medicaid recovery. 
In this instance, Melvin did not convey a life estate interest to Cathie before his death. If he 
had, that interest would be subject to estate recovery in the estate. Melvin conveyed a remainder 
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interest subject only to his reserved life estate. 
For that reason, the latter portion of the statute quoted above was misapplied by the Trial 
Court. The Court should reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to correct these 
fmdings. It can be inferred from the plain language of subsection b, that the legislature intended to 
identify those assets in which the decedent's interest succeeds or continues after his death; Le. a 
remainder or reversionary interest after the life estate conveyance ceases upon his death, an interest 
that may otherwise be subject to survivorship transfer such as co-tenancy or joint tenancy. But the 
statute clearly does not specify a life estate held by the decedent at time of death as an asset of the 
estate for recovery purposes. 
Since Idaho Code §56-218(b) does not specifically require inclusion of Melvin's life estate 
into estate assets, does Idaho probate code require include the life est.ate under subsection (a)? 
b. Idaho Code § 56~218(a) does not include a life estate in the 
estate. 
Idaho Code.§ 56-218(4)(a) provides that the term estate shall include "all real and personal 
property and other assets included within the individual's estate as defined for J,2.urposes ofstatf}. 
probate law''- I.C. § 56-218(4)(a)(2-012). 
The Idaho Probate Code imposes a duty upon the personal representative to inventory and 
appraise all "property owned by the decedent at the time of his death. listing it with reasonable 
detail, and indicating as to each listed item its fair :market value as of the date of the decedent's 
death;'. IC.§ 15-3-706 (2012). 
Idaho Code§ 15~1M201(16) defines an "estate" as ''all property of the decedent, including 
community property of the surviving spouse, subject to administration, property of trusts, and 
Al'PELLANT'S BlUlW - 8 
05-30-'12 17:10 FROM-FEAT STON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-788 P0012/0022 F-657 
property of any other person whose affairs are subject to this code as it exists from time to time 
during administration''. Idaho Code§ 15-1~201(16)(2012). 
"A life estate is an interest in real property, the dmation of which is limited by the life of 
some person." Tobias v. State Tax Commission, 85 Idaho 250, 255, 378 P.2d 628, _ (1963); 
quoting Thompson on Real Property, Volume Il, § 780. 
"It is important to realize, hovvever, that if the deceased owned a life estate during his or her 
life, the life estate will terminate upon death and will not be part of the estate." 121 Am.Jur. -
Proof of Facts 3d, 101 (2011). 
The Court included the life estate as an asset of the Estate. The Trial record contains no 
testimony or evidence that would indicate a value of the life estate, or even any authority that the 
life estate is an asset of Melvin's estate. The Trial Court and the State have taken as an assumption 
that the life estate is properly an, asset of the estate under relying entirely upon an improper reading 
of Idaho Code § 56-218. However, the Department's inteipretation of I.C. § 56-218(4)(b) is not 
supported by the actual language of the statute. 
Relying upon the Second District decision in Grothk. with. really no independent analysis. 
the Trial Court concluded that Melvin's life estate must be included in the estate assets. Grothe 
Court concluded that the Idaho Legislature, in adopting Idaho Code§ 56-218, must have intended 
to modify the common law so as to include life estates as estate assets for purposes of Medicaid 
recovery. However, that conclusion is not supported by the plain language of the statute, as 
discussed above. 
From this conclusion~ the Trial Comt compounds the error by erroneously applying Rule 
837 to "value" the life estate. 
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B. Rule 837 is inapplicable by its own terms. 
Tue State ofldaho argues that I.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05, entitled Rules Governing Eligibility for 
Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled, diet.ates the Court's ruling in valuing Melvin's life estate at 
the time of his death. 
Rule 837 reads in pertinent part as follows: 
RULE 837 - LIFE ESTATE AS ASSET TRANSFER. 
01. Transfer of a Remainder Interest. When a life estate in 
real property is retajned by an individual, and a remainder interest in 
the property is transferred during jl}c; look back period _for less than 
the fair market value of the remainder interest transferred, the value 
of the uncompensated remainder is subject to the assert transfer 
penalty as described in Sections 831 tlrrough 835 of these rules. To 
compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply the fair 
market value of the real property at the time of transfer by the 
remainder factor for the narticipant's age at the time of transfer 
listed in the following table: 
I.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05.837 
[underline added] 
A simple reading of Rule 837 makes clear that it was not adopted for the application 
proposed by the State in this matter. The Rule clearly states its intent to compute a '°transfer 
penalty" where a Medicaid recipient/applicant has improperly transferred a remainder interest and 
retained to himself a life estate "during the look back period far less than the fair market value of 
the remainder interest". 
By its very language above, the Rule~ and the computation table within it, is used during the 
lifetime of an applicant holding a life estate to detennine eligibility~ or appropriate penalty, for 
transfers dwing the look back period. 3 Since one can assume that Medicaid assistance applications 
3 Asset transfer penalties are assessed pursuant to Rules 831 through 836 to Medicaid 
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are not submitted by decedents but live persons requiring medical care, it is obvious error to apply a 
life est.ate calculation table that assumes the holder to be alive, to determine the value of a life estate 
at time of death. 
Valuation of a life estate during the holder's life time, is a recognized activity. 
"The value of the life estate is determined by a fonnula which talces 
into account the age and life expectancy of the Jjfe tenant. The 
longer the life expectancy of the life tenant, the greater is the value 
of the life estate". 
West v. Tax Commission, 99 Idaho 26, 27, 
576 P.2d 1060, 1061 (1978). 
At no time does the State or the Trial Court provide authority for the application of Rule 
837 to a decedent's life estate at the time of death. Again, the Trial Court accepts the Grothe 
decision wholesale, with no independent analysis. 
The process of determining an asset transfer penalty during the lifetime of the Medicaid 
participant certainly involves actuarial determinations, however, the valuation of a life estate, at the 
time of a measuring life's death, no longer logically involves those same actuarial detenninations. 
The decedent has died. There is no accounting for future life expectancy. 
The Idaho Probate Code requires only that a Personal Representative prepare an inventory 
of property ~'owned by the decedent at the time of his death". Idaho Code§ 15-3-706. It does not 
require a determination of assets owned prior to the death of the decedent or up to the date of death, 
but only those assets at the time of his death. It is undisputed that, at coi.nmon law, a life est.ate 
ceases to exist at the death of the holder and therefore has no value, nor is it an asset of the estate. 
Tobias v. State Tax Commission, 85 Idaho 250, 255, 378 P.2d 628, _ (1963); quoting 
participants in long term care or H.C.B.S. See I.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05.831. 
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Thompson on Real Property, Volume II, § 780. 
Since the life estate terminated at Melvin Peterson's death, there is no asset to value. The 
Trial Court's application of Rule 837 to set such a percentage value is improper and should be 
reversed and remanded with instruction that the life estate has no value.4 
4 The State presented no evidence of value to the life estate other than applying Rule 837. 
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C. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine the issues before 
it. 
"It is the general rule that where title to real property is an issue between an estate and its 
heirs and a third person, such issue must be tried in an independent action brought for that purpose 
in a competent tribunal and cannot be tried by the probate court." In re Lundy's Estate, 79 Idaho 
185, 193, 312 P.2d 1028, 1032 (1957). "A Probate Court cannot try the question of title as those 
issues must be brought in Disttict Comt." fu re Blackington's Estate, 29 Idaho 310, 158 P. 
492 (1916). 
The Stat:e sought and received a CoUit Order that the Estate has a percentage interest based 
upon the asset transfer tables set forth in Rule 837. This finding is beyond the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the probate court. As indicated all along, Cathie is appearing only through a special 
appearance resetving jurisdiction, both personal and subject matter. The State failed to achieve 
process upon Cathie or her property in doing so. 
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D. The Court lacks personal Jurisdiction over Cathie. 
Cathie was originally appointed as personal representative of the Estate. At no time has she 
been personally served with any process as an interested party holding legal title to the real property 
the State seeks to sell so as to satisfy its claim.. 
A judgment entered without meeting the jurisdictional requirements of service of process or 
due process. deprives the court of julisdiction over the person and is void. McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 
Idaho 727. 100 P.3d 621 (2004) 
"The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and United States 
Constitutions requii:es that a person involved in the judicial process be given meaningful notice 
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard." McGloon v. Gwvnn, 140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 
621; 623; 2004 WL 2377859 (2004) 
Cathie submitted to the Court's jurisdiction as Personal Representative at the time of her 
appointment in 2007. Idaho Code §15-3-602. The Trial Court continued to have jurisdiction 
over Cathie after her removal as to her position as "Personal Representative'', but at no time has 
the State provided meaningful due process to Cathie, individually, as to her interest in the real 
property that they seek to sell so as to satisfy the State's Claim against the Estate. 
Cathie has participated subject only to a Demand for Notice and Special Appearance 
reserving these issues of jurisdiction. This Court is asked to reverse the Trial Court's Order Re: 
Value of Estate Interest as it was entered unlawfully and without due process upon Cathie, 
individually. 
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E. The Trial Court disregarded the testimony that Cathie invested significant 
funds into the Property in reliance upon her Deed from Melvin. 
The testimony at tri.al was undisputed that Cathie invested over $3000.00 into 
improvements into the property in the belief that she owned the property from time of the deed in 
December, 2001. Trial Exhibit 1 totals $2,982.51 of expenditures on the property, not including 
numerous others for which receipts no longer exist. She testified the property was in significant 
disrepair when she took title and that a quiet title was necessacy to clear a third party's ownership 
from the title. From 2001 until 2007 when Melvin died, the State took no action to give Cathie 
notice of their intent to take her home from her and the investment she had made into improving 
that home. Even the State's Notice of Statutory Claim letter dated April 24, 2007 (Ex. 5) 
acknowledges that at common law a life estate "dies" with the life tenant, but reiterates the 
State's misreading ofldaho Code §56-218 to include Melvin's life estate in his estate for 
Medicaid recovery purposes. 
Inexplicably, the Trial Court disregarded Cathie's documented investment into the 
property made in reliance upon her legal title to the property. This Court is asked to reverse the 
Trial Court and remand with instmction to allow Cathie recovery of her investment into the 
property. 
APPELLAN"f'S nnlEF. 15 L\l"t5 
05-30-'12 17:11 FROM-FEA STON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-788 P0019/0022 F-657 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Court: is asked to reverse the Trial Court and remand with instructions to the Trial 
Court to make findings and conclusions, as follows: 
1. Melvin Peterson conveyed fee title remainder mvnership to Cathie in certain real 
property on December 5, 200 I, reserving to hlmself a life estate. 
2. Cathie, in reliance upon the deed. and as an occupant and possessor of said real 
property during Melvin Peterson,s lifetime, made certain improvements and incurred expenses for 
the improvement of the real property, as her residence, totaling several thousand dollars. 
3. Several years later, Melvin applied for and received Medicaid benefits through the 
State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare. 
4. TI1e State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, apparently determined at the 
time of Melvin's application that no asset transfer penalty should be imposed on the basis of 
Melvin's then existing retained life estate. 
5. Melvin died March 3, 2007, and was 83 years of age. 
6. At common law, Melvin~s life estate terminated at the time of his death by operation 
of law and leaving his estate holding no legal interest in the real property. 
7. The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, filed a claim for Medicaid 
benefits of$171)86.94. 
8. The State of Idaho was provided an opportunity at trial on September 29, 2011, to 
introduce evidence of a proper valuation of the life estate of Melvin at the time of his death and 
introduced no such evidence. 
... 
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9. By operation of law, the life estate of Melvin ceased to exist at the time of his death 
and, therefore, had no value. 
10. Idaho Code §56-218(b) does not alter, modify or repeal the conunou law principles 
of life estates. Idaho probate code and case law does not include a life estatei measured by the life 
of the decedent, as an interest in the Estate of that decedent. 
11. Rule 837 is specifically restricted to detemrining an appropriate value during the life 
of a Medicaid beneficiary for purposes of imposing an asset transfer penalty and is, therefore, 
inapplicable for purposes of determining a life estate value at the 1ime of death. 
12. The State, having foiled to provide any evidence as to the value of the life estate, no 
such value or interest can be attributed Melvin's life estate in the real property conveyed by 
Warranty Deed on December 5, 2001. 
13. The State is not entitled to any lien or interest attributable to the life estate at issue in 
this matter. 
14. Further, Cathie was not properly made a party to this proceeding by service of 
process or other appropriate due process that would vest the Trial Court with personal jurisdiction 
over Cathie and her real property at issue. 
15. Further, the Magistrate Court, acting as Probate Court in these proceedings, lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho law. 
16. Finally, Cathie equitably relied upon the Warranty Deed dated December 5, 2001, 
and incurred expenses, improving the real property in reliance upon the deed from Melvin Peterson 
totaling several thousand dollars. 
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17. The Court further finds that the Department failed to file or perfect any proper lien 
or other encumbrance which would provide actual or constructive notice to Cathie of the interests 
claimed by the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare. As such, the Court finds that it 
would be inequitable for the Court to impose a lien or assess an interest in the real property. 
As prevailing party, the Appellant requests award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 
Idallo Code §12-117, 120, 121 and 123. for the reason that the State has acted unreasonably, and 
without foundation in fact or law. 
DATED this 301h day of May, 2012. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order establishing the value of the primary asset of the estate, 
the life estate interest held by the decedent before his death. The underlying dispute involves a 
creditor's claim filed by the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the 
"Department") for Medicaid estate recovery as provided in Idaho Code§ 56-218. "Medicaid 
estate recovery" is a program required by federal Medicaid law that seeks to recover assets of 
deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, in order to reimburse the taxpayers for 
expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. The Department's claim involves the 
value of a life estate which the Medicaid recipient had retained upon gifting his real property to 
his daughter, Cathie Peterson. 
Course of Proceedings 
Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative in this matter July 26, 2007. 
The personal representative mailed a "Notice to Known Creditor" to the Department on 
August 6, 2007. She also published a Notice to Creditors with a first publication date of August 
16, 2007. 
On November 19, 2007, the Department filed a timely Claim Against Estate, in the 
amount of $171,134.28, and a Demand for Notice. 
Without stating any reason, the personal representative denied the Department's claim, 
mailing a "Disallowance of Creditor's Claim and Request for Itemization" to the Department on 
November 28, 2007. 
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On December 10, 2007, the Department filed an Amended Claim Against Estate in the 
amount of $171,3 86. 94. 1 At the same time, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of 
Claim. 
The following day, the personal representative, again, disallowed the Department's claim 
without stating any reason. See Notice ofDisallowance of Claim dated December 11, 2007. In 
response, a Petition to Require Payment of Claim was filed by the Department on December 19, 
2007, and a Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim was filed on December 28, 2007. 
About January 2, 2008, the personal representative filed a document called "Objections" 
in which she objected to the procedure, but still did not state any reason for the disallowance of 
the claim. 
After a hearing on March 25, 2008, the court entered its Order Granting Petition for 
Allowance of Amended Claim. 
On May 5, 2008, the Department filed a Petition to Require Payment of Claim, which 
together with the Department's Brief in support of Petition to Require Payment of Claim, set 
forth the Department's demand for payment of the value of the life estate. See Idaho Code § 56-
218(4)(b). 
About May 28, 2008, the personal representative filed "Personal Representative's 
Inventory." At the same time, the personal representative filed her Objection to Petition to 
Require Payment of Claim, stating its position relating to the life estate. 
1Since health care providers have up to one year after the service to present claims to Medicaid, it is not 
uncommon for the initial claim to increase somewhat. 
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After a hearing, the Court entered its "Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim" on 
June 12, 2008. This order established the life estate as an asset of the estate for purposes of 
Medicaid recovery and ordered the personal representative to amend the Inventory and assign an 
appropriate value to the life estate. 
About August 5, 2008, the personal representative filed her Motion to Hire Appraiser. 
The Department objected, in part, by its "Objection to Motion to Hire Appraiser" filed August 
11, 2008. 
After a hearing, the Court entered its "Order Approving Hiring of Appraiser" on 
September 23, 2008, approving an appraisal determining the fee simple value of the real 
property. 
On May 14, 2009, the Department filed its "Motion to Compel Short Form Appraisal" 
contending the appraisal approved by the court in September, 2008, had never been performed. 
On July 15, 2009, the Department filed its "Petition to Compel Sale of Home and 
Payment to Department," together with a "Notice of Filing Appraisal Report and Addendum." 
After a hearing on July 28, 2009, the court entered its "Order Granting Petition to 
Compel" on August 11, 2009. 
The personal representative appealed from this order, filing a "Notice of Appeal" about 
August 19, 2009. 
A "Decision on Appeal" was issued by the District Court on May 25, 2010, vacating the 
"Order Granting Petition to Compel" and remanding "so that findings of facts and conclusions of 
law can be established." 
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About June 22, 2010, the personal representative filed a "Petition for Authority to Sell," 
together with a "Petition for Approval of and Partial Payment of Attorney Fees and Costs," 
seeking to liquidate an escrow account and pay the attorney for the personal representative. On 
the same day, the personal representative filed an "Amended Personal Representative's 
Inventory" for the first time listing the life estate in the inventory, but assigning the life estate a 
value of $0. 
On June 30, 2010, the Department filed its "Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law." A status conference was held on July 27, 2010, during which Judge Julian indicated an 
evidentiary hearing would be held on October 21, 2010 to determine all remaining factual issues. 
On July 28, 2010, the Department submitted its "First Requests for Admission" to the 
personal representative. 
After a hearing on August 10, 2010, the Court, on August 17, 2010, entered its "Order for 
Partial Payment of Attorney Fees and Payment of Costs" approving a partial payment of attorney 
fees in an amount to be stipulated by the parties. At the same time, the Court deferred the 
Department's Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to follow the trial scheduled 
for October 21, 2010. 
The parties' "Stipulation Regarding Partial Payment of Attorney Fees" was filed about 
August 24, 2010, with the parties agreeing to reserve objections to the final settlement of the 
estate. 
About August 27, 2010, the personal representative submitted her Responses to First 
Requests for Admission and thereafter, on September 7, 2010, the Department filed its "Notice 
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of Deposition" to take the oral testimony of the personal representative. An "Amended Notice of 
Deposition" was filed on September 15, 2010. 
Two days later, on September 17, 2010, Attorney Brent Featherston filed a "Demand for 
Notice and Special Appearance" on behalf of "Cathie Peterson, individually." Said notice also 
stated: "The undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss all orders entered with regard to her real 
property pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)." At the same time, attorney Brent Featherston, on 
behalf of "Cathie Peterson, individually" filed a "Motion for Automatic Disqualification of Judge 
I.R.C.P. 40( d)(l )." 
On September 22, 2010, the personal representative (through attorney John Finney) filed 
"Personal Representative's Final Accounting and Petition for Decree of Distribution." On the 
same day, the Department filed its "Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause" 
and its "Motion to Strike." Also on the same day, attorney Brent Featherston, on behalf of 
"Cathie Peterson, individually" filed an "Amended Motion for Automatic Disqualification of 
Judge I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)." 
On September 27, 2010, the Court entered its "Order Denying Amended Motion for 
Automatic Disqualification - IRCP 40( d)(l ). " 
Also on September 27, 2010, the Department filed a "Notice to Vacate Deposition." 
On September 28, 2010, the personal representative filed "Objections" to the 
Department's petitions. 
On October 7, 2010, hearing was held on the Department's "Petition for Removal of 
Personal Representative for Cause" and its "Motion to Strike." On the same day, the court 
entered its "Order Removing Personal Representative." Cathie Peterson, through attorney John 
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Finney filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing the removal of Cathie Peterson as personal 
representative about October 12, 2010. This court entered its Order, affirming the Magistrate, on 
May 11, 2011. 
Thereafter, the court issued a Notice of Hearing and a court trial was held on September 
29, 2011. The parties submitted their closing arguments in writing. The court issued its 
Memorandum Decision on December 22, 2011, and its "Order re: Value of Estate Interest" on 
January 10, 2012. 
This appeal followed. 
Statement of the Facts 
The relevant facts are simple. Melvin Peterson ("Melvin") was bor and 
died at the age of 83 on March 3, 2007. Petition to Require Payment of Claim, ,-r 1. Prior to his 
death, but after reaching the age of 55, Melvin applied for and received state medical assistance 
(Medicaid) benefits in the amount of$171,386.94. Petition to Require Payment of Claim,, 2. 
Melvin owned real property in Moyie Springs which, on December 6, 2001, he conveyed to his 
daughter Cathie Peterson, retaining a life estate. Exhibit "A" to Petition to Require Payment of 
Claim. Melvin possessed this life estate interest at the time of his death. 
Cathie Peterson lived on the real property in which Melvin owned a life estate interest 
during his life, and thereafter, and performed maintenance and provided some modest 
improvements to the structures on the property, but was unable to testify that her expenditures 
had any affect on the value of the property. Tr. p. 38, ll. 7-9. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Cathie Peterson can now appeal the Magistrate's Order on Petition to 
Require Payment of Claim (06/12/2008). 
2. Whether the Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-11 7. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(u)(l) sets forth the standard ofreview for appeals to the 
district court from the magistrate's division, as follows: 
Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not involving a 
trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine 
the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards 
of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the 
statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court. 
Rule 83(u)(l ), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Idaho Supreme Court in Hawkins v. 
Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 589 P.2d 532 (1978), explained the import of Rule 83(u)(l): 
We read [I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l)] as saying that a district court, in making an 
appellate review of a magistrate's decision, should perform that task in the same 
manner as this Court performs its appellate review of the trial decision of a district 
court. In reviewing a magistrate's findings, therefore, the district courts should 
adhere to the well recognized rule that findings based on substantial and 
competent, though conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Prescott 
v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257, 542 P.2d 1176 (1975); Isaguirre v. Eschevarria, 96 
Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 471 (1975); I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
Hawkins, 99 Idaho at 788-789, 589 P.2d at 535-536. Moreover, in Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 
Idaho 117, 124 P.3d 993 (2005), the Idaho Supreme Court said: 
Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not 
involving a trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and 
determine the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same 
standards of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court 
under the statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme 
Court. I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l) (2004). 
* * * 
Substantial evidence is " 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but less than a 
preponderance.'" Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 136 Idaho 
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761, 764, 40 P.3d 119, 122 (2002) (quoting Evans v. Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 
478, 849 P.2d 934, 939 (1993) ). 
Marchbanks, 142 Idaho at 119, 124 P.3d at 995. With regard to the Magistrate's conclusions of 
law, the Idaho Court of Appeals has said: 
Where a district court sits as an appellate court for the purpose of reviewing a 
magistrate's judgment, the district court is required to determine whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact. If those findings 
are so supported, and if the conclusions of law demonstrate proper application of 
legal principles to the facts found, then the district court will affirm the 
magistrate's judgment. The judgment also will be upheld on further appeal. See 
Ustickv. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct.App.1983). 
Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (App.,1988). 
II. 
THE DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE 
In Appellant's Brief, Cathie Peterson contends: 
The State, as successor personal representative, did not file any pleadings or 
notices of what claims, issues or other matters were to be determined or tried. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 2. The suggestion seems to be that the Department was somehow to blame 
for her being confused as to what issues were to be presented at trial. She had been, however, 
until just before the hearing, the personal representative in this matter and had been contesting 
the Department's claim to the life estate for some four years. In her first appeal to this court, 
Peterson appealed the Magistrate's Order Granting Petition to Compel (08/11/2009) in which the 
Magistrate ordered the real property to be sold and the Department to be paid $53,712, less a 
proportionate share of the costs of sale. In that matter, Peterson argued that: 
The Magistrate erred in purportedly concluding that the decedent had an 
interest at the time of death and in purportedly determining the extent of such 
interest, in certain real property based upon a life estate. 
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Appellant's Brief (11112/2009) p. 13. This court concluded its Decision on Appeal as follows: 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's August 11, 2009, "Order Granting 
Petition to Compel Sale of Home. and Payment to Department" is vacated and the 
matter is remanded so that findings of facts and conclusions of law can be 
established. 
Decision on Appeal (05/25/2010) p. 12. Thereafter, on June 30, 2010, the Department filed its 
Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law. Among the requested conclusions of law 
were the following: 
20. The life estate, as it existed the moment before the death of Melvin 
Peterson, is an asset of the estate, for purposes of the Department's Medicaid 
recovery claim, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4). 
21. Had Melvin Peterson transferred the life estate to Cathie Peterson 
the moment before his death, the value of the transferred asset would have been 
determined pursuant to IDAPA 16.03.05.837, which is .38642 of the fair market 
value, or $53,712.38. The life estate factor of .38642 of the fair market value of 
the real property is the appropriate valuation of the estate's interest in the real 
property gifted to Cathie Peterson by the Gift Deed of December 5, 2001. 
22. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), the estate is the owner of a 
38.642% undivided interest in the real property described in Exhibit "A." 
Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (06/30/2010), p. 5, ifif 20-22. At the 
hearing of this matter, the Department, having recently become the personal representative, 
submitted its "Personal Representative's Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
These had been altered only to reflect the Department's changed role and the fact that Peterson 
was no longer personal representative. Among the requested conclusions of law were the 
following: 
7. The life estate, as it existed the moment before the death of Melvin 
Peterson, is an asset of the estate, for purposes of the Department's Medicaid 
recovery claim, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4). 
8. Had Melvin Peterson transferred the life estate to Cathie Peterson 
the moment before his death, the value of the transferred asset would have been 
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determined pursuant to IDAPA 16.03.05.837, which is .38642 of the fair market 
value. The life estate factor of .38642 of the fair market value of the real property 
is the appropriate valuation of the estate's interest in the real property gifted to 
Cathie Peterson by the Gift Deed of December 5, 2001. 
9. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), the estate is the owner of a 
38.642% undivided interest in the real property described in Exhibit "A." 
Personal Representative's Requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (09/29/2011). As 
can be seen, the only difference is in the numbering and the removal of the fixed amount, since, 
as personal representative, the Department would need to proceed to District Court in a partition 
action to have the property sold and the proceeds divided. 2 
So, there was no surprise here. It should have been obvious to all that the primary issue 
for trial would be the valuation of the estate's interest in the real property. And this is exactly 
what the Magistrate decided. In his "Order re: Value of Estate Interest" the Magistrate held: 
2. The value of the estate's interest in the real property gift deeded to 
Cathie Peterson, as recorded in instrument #204218 in Boundary County, shall be 
that proportion of the fair market value of the entire fee interest in the real 
properly [legal description omitted] as calculated by the reference tables set forth 
in IDAPA 16.03.05.837, and the Department shall have a lien upon said property 
for such value; 
3. Cathie Peterson is not entitled to any credit or offset for sums 
expended to maintain or improve the real property while in her possession; 
Order re: Value of Estate Interest, pp. 1-2. 
2While the Magistrate saw this as a new position of the Department, the ultimate purpose of the Department's 
petition to remove the personal representative was to allow the Department, as successor personal representative, to bring 
a partition action in District Court against Cathie Peterson. See Tr. (10/07/2010) p. 5, II. 20-23; Respondent's Brief 
(02/25/2011), pp. 27-28. 
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III. 
THE MAGISTRATE'S JUNE 12, 2008, ORDER ON 
PETITION TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF CLAIM IS FINAL 
AND NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL HERE. 
A. The Magistrate's June 12, 2008. Order Should Not Be Subject to Challenge in this Third 
Appeal. 
Peterson's first issue on appeal challenges the Magistrate's June 12, 2008, "Order on 
Petition to Require Payment of Claim" in which the Magistrate held that the life estate retained 
by the decedent was an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid estate recovery. See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-9. In Peterson's first appeal to this court, then as personal 
representative, Peterson challenged this same order and holding. See Appellant's Brief 
(11/12/2009) pp. 6-12. The Department contended that the June 12, 2008, order was a final order 
that could have been appealed earlier, and, therefore, the appeal was too late, and barred. This 
court, however, held that the June 12, 2008, order was interlocutory and not appealable, and 
therefore, under the doctrine stated in Matter of the Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 678 P .2d 
108 (Ct. App. 1984), prior interlocutory orders could be reviewed. Decision on Appeal 
(0512512010), pp. 8-10. This court then remanded the matter for findings of fact and conclusions 
oflaw. Id. at 12. 
In Peterson's second appeal to this court she challenged her removal as personal 
representative. Part of the grounds for her removal, however, was her failure to comply with the 
June 12, 2008 order requiring her to give an appropriate value to the life estate as an estate asset. 
Tr. (11126/2010) p. 34, ll. 9-19. Her failure to comply with this order was also argued in the 
briefing. See Respondent's Brief (02/24/2011), pp. 25-26. Therefore, had Peterson desired to 
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challenge the June 12, 2008, Order, she should have done so no later than in the second appeal 
where it was directly in issue. Nothing in the Estate of Spencer case suggests the ability to 
challenge interlocutory orders goes on indefinitely. 
If the court determines that the June 12, 2008, Order is still subject to appeal, then, the 
following argument shows the life estate is clearly an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid 
recovery: 
B. The Life Estate Is an Asset Subject to Estate Recovery. 
In 1993, Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, commonly 
referred to as OBRA '93. This act, codified primarily in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, contained a number 
of provisions intended to enhance Medicaid estate recovery, including strict restrictions on 
transfers to trusts and an expanded definition of estate. These changes were made to assure 
recovery of property that would otherwise pass outside of probate and, therefore might be lost to 
estate recovery. Idaho adopted the expanded definition of estate effective July 1, 1995. It is 
found in Idaho Code§ 56-218(4): 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such 
interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor. heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy. tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate. living trust or other arrangement.3 
3This language is taken word for word from 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
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Idaho Code § 56-218( 4) (emphasis added). Therefore, for purposes of estate recovery, the estate 
subject to the Department's claim includes a retained life estate held by a Medicaid recipient or 
his spouse at time of death. 
This, of course, is contrary to common law. At common law, a life estate terminated and 
the interest passed to the remainderman upon the death of the holder. Where, as here, the life 
estate passes an interest in property to a survivor or heir, Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b) abrogates 
common law to the extent necessary to preserve the life estate interest for estate recovery. 
Oregon has an estate recovery law very similar to Idaho's (indeed it is likely that Idaho's original 
estate recovery law was copied from Oregon). Oregon has also adopted the expanded definition 
of estate for purposes of estate recovery. In the case of State Dept. of Human Services v. 
Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, 136 P .3d 66 (2006), Oregon brought an action to recover the value 
of a life estate of a deceased Medicaid recipient where, like here, the property had been conveyed 
to the child of the Medicaid recipient, retaining a life estate. The facts are nearly identical to 
those here. In the Willingham case, however, the life estate had been created in 1993 before the 
1995 adoption of the expanded definition of estate. The Medicaid payments had been made after 
the adoption of the new law. Therefore, the primary issue was whether the 1995 law would be 
applied to the 1993 life estate.4 The Oregon Court of Appeals examined the legal effect of the 
expanded definition of estate and its application to life estates and concluded that the law 
abrogated the common law, and the life estate interest was preserved after death for purposes of 
estate recovery: 
4This issue is not present here. The life estate in this case was created December 6, 2001, well after the July 1, 
1995, effective date ofldaho's law. 
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Based on that change in the law in 1995, we agree with the state that the legal 
effect of the legislature's amendment was to modify the common law rule that a 
life estate interest is extinguished under the circumstances established by the 
statute. For pm:poses of the recovery of medical assistance paid by the state during 
the lifetime of the holder of a life estate interest. the life estate continues to exist 
after the death of the person holding the interest. 
Willingham, 206 Or.App. at 160, 136 P.3d at 68 (underline added); see also Bonta v. Burke, 98 
Cal.App.4th 788, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 (2002) (where the Medicaid recipient mother had retained a 
life estate and a right to revoke the remainder, the life estate was not extinguished on her death, 
but rather was an asset of the estate for purposes of estate recovery); In re Estate of Laughead, 
696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2005) (life estate in farm owned by deceased Medicaid recipient was 
required to be included in the estate for purposes of estate recovery). 
All of these cases consistently construe the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) 
which was adopted by each state, including Idaho. 
C. The Value of the Life Estate Is Determined at the Moment Before Death. 
Peterson claims the life estate has no value because it is extinguished at death. However, 
as shown by the cases cited above, the value of the life estate is determined the moment before 
death, not after. This issue was specifically addressed in the case of In re Estate of Laughead, 
supra: 
Whether Ruby, "at the time of her death," had an interest in the real property at 
issue here is determined as of a point in time immediately before her death. See In 
re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding ''the phrase 'at the 
time of death' means the time immediately before the Medicaid recipient's 
death"). Immediately prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 acres of 
land. For reasons that follow, we hold her life estate constituted an interest in real 
property within the meaning of section 249A.5(2)( c ). 
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In re Estate of Laughead, 696 N. W.2d at 316. Any other interpretation would make the life 
estate language in Idaho Code § 56-218( 4)(b) a nullity. The court, of course, will not give a 
statute an interpretation which would render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 
P.3d 116, 121(App.2001). The purpose of the expanded definition of estate is met by 
recognizing the value of the property at the moment before the death of the Medicaid recipient. 
Peterson offers a novel interpretation ofldaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b) in which she says it 
would apply if the decedent had given Peterson his own life estate, i.e., transferred the property 
to her for his life. However, that doesn't make any sense because the property would then revert 
to his estate on his death and would be part of the ordinary probate estate. If that were the case, 
Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(a) would apply, and the life estate language in subsection (4)(b) would 
be totally superfluous. Peterson's interpretation is not supported by any case law or other 
authority. 
Judge Julian was also persuaded by the opinions of Judge Gaskill in the very similar 
Second District case of Matter of the Estate of Grothe, Nez Perce County Case No. CV02-02163 
which he attached to his decision in this matter. 
IV. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE 
DEPARTMENT'S LIFE ESTATE VALUATION RULES. 
Peterson argues that the life estate tables in Rule 8375 should not be used because the 
tables should be applied only during the lifetime of the Medicaid recipient. Appellant's Brief, p. 
10. That argument is not based on any specific language in the rule and does not make sense. 
5JDAPA 16.03.05.837. 
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The life estate must be valued immediately before death. As explained in In re Estate of 
Laughead, supra: 
Whether Ruby, "at the time of her death," had an interest in the real property at 
issue here is determined as of a point in time immediately before her death. See In 
re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding "the phrase 'at the 
time of death' means the time immediately before the Medicaid recipient's 
death"). Immediately prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 acres of 
land. For reasons that follow, we hold her life estate constituted an interest in real 
property within the meaning of section 249 A.5(2)( c ). 
In re Estate of Laughead, 696 N. W.2d at 316. Had Melvin Peterson signed a quit-claim deed 
immediately before his death, ceding his life estate interest to Cathie Peterson, the tables found in 
Rule 837 would be applied. It makes no sense to say that some other measure should be used a 
few moments later after Melvin Peterson had expired. 
Peterson, for her part, has offered no other basis for valuing the life estate, other than to 
again argue that there should be no value at all, in essence inviting the court to ignore section 
218(4)(b) entirely. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. This is not a reasonable alternative. Having failed 
to offer any reasonable alternative valuation of the life estate, Peterson should not be permitted to 
simply object to the reasonable and obvious application of the life estate tables in Rule 837. 
v. 
THE MAGISTRATE HAD JURISDICTION TO 
DETERMINE AND VALUE ESTATE ASSETS. 
Peterson argues that the Magistrate lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the 
estate's interest in the real property. Appellant's Brief, p. 13. She cites In re Lundy's Estate, 79 
Idaho 185, 312 P.2d 1028 (1957) for the proposition that the probate court does not have 
authority to determine title to real property as between the estate or heirs and third parties. 
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However, just as in Lundy 's Estate, Peterson is not a third party. The dispute in Lundy 's Estate 
was between the decedent's surviving wife and his children from a prior marriage. The issues 
that had to be decided included the validity of certain quitclaim deeds and a property settlement 
agreement and whether, in light of those documents, the estate consisted of either community or 
separate property. As to jurisdiction to determine the real property issues, the court explained: 
It is the general rule that where title to real property is in issue between an estate 
and its heirs and a third person, such issue must be tried in an independent action 
brought for that purpose in a competent tribunal and cannot be tried by the probate 
court. 
However, this is not such a case. Here the issue is between the 
administratrix claiming as sole heir and appellants claiming they are the sole heirs. 
In probate proceedings the probate court is a court of record and has 'original 
jurisdiction in all matters of probate, settlement of estates of deceased persons, 
and appointment of guardians'. We have held that this probate jurisdiction 
bestowed on the probate court by the constitution is exclusive. 
* * * 
Here no stranger or third party is involved. The issue is drawn between rival 
claimants to heirship. As between such parties the probate court has jurisdiction 
to settle all issues essentially involved in a determination of who are the heirs, and 
the distributive share or shares of each. 
In order to determine whether the property was community or separate and 
thus to determine to whom it should descend it was necessary for the probate 
court to pass upon the validity of the quitclaim deeds and the property settlement 
agreement. 
'Whether the property was separate property or community property was 
one of the questions to be determined by the probate court and by the parties 
submitted to that court for its decision. That court had authority to determine the 
persons who, by law, were entitled to the property. and also the proportions or 
parts to which each was entitled, who were the heirs of the deceased, and who 
were entitled to succeed to the estate, and their respective shares and interests 
therein.' 
Lundy's Estate, 79 Idaho at 193-4, 312 P.2d at 1032-3 (citations omitted; underline added). Just 
as in Lundy 's Estate Peterson is not a stranger or third party; she is the daughter of the decedent 
and an heir of the estate. The question before the probate court was whether the life estate 
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interest passed to her on the decedent's death or whether it remained an asset of the estate. 
Having determined that the life estate was an asset of the estate, the probate court was also 
competent to decide its value. While Peterson, who was personal representative for most of the 
time this matter has been pending, likes to portray herself as an outsider and a third party, 
nothing could be further from the truth. 
Idaho Code § 1-2208(2) assigns probate and estate administration cases to the 
magistrates. This is so irrespective of the value of the estate or its assets. Keeven vs. Estate of 
Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 882 P.2d 457 (App. 1994). Idaho Code§ 15-3-104 gives exclusive 
jurisdiction to this court to determine claims against the decedent and his successors: 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his successors 
may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a personal 
representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and 
actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the procedure 
prescribed by this chapter. 
* * * 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-104 (underline added). Peterson is, very clearly, a successor to Melvin 
Peterson, as well as an heir. She is Melvin Peterson's daughter and the ordinary successor to the 
remainder interest in the life estate. 
Moreover, the personal representative of an estate has the authority and duty to value the 
assets of the estate. Idaho Code§ 15-3-706. The personal representative may petition the court 
and seek orders related to his duties. Idaho Code§ 15-3-105. Clearly the court had authority to 
enter an order valuing the life estate as an estate asset. 
The issue here is not whether the probate court could partition the property to divide 
estate assets from non-estate assets. Now that the Department is the named personal 
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representative, the Department intends to proceed to District Court with a partition action. The 
Department represented as much to the Magistrate who made that part of his order. So any 
division of the real property will ultimately be done by the District Court. The Magistrate merely 
determined the assets of the estate and the value as between the estate and Peterson, an heir. This 
was clearly with the authority of the probate court. 
Likewise, there is no issue here with regard to personal jurisdiction. Probate cases are in 
the nature of proceedings in rem and the court's orders apply to all who are given notice. As 
stated in Connolly v. Probate Court in and for Kootenai County, 25 Idaho 35, 136 P. 205 (1913): 
The Supreme Court of California in that case, after stating that the proceeding for 
the distribution of an estate is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which is in the 
hands of an administrator or executor for distribution, says: "By giving the notice 
directed by the statute, the entire world is called before the court, and the court 
acquires jurisdiction over all persons for the purpose of determining their rights to 
any portion of the estate; and every person who may assert any right or interest 
therein is required to present his claim to the court for its determination. ***" 
Connolly, 25 Idaho at_, 136 P. at_ (quoting William Hill Co. v. Lawler, 116 Cal. 359, 48 
Pac. 323 ). Notice requirements for probate proceedings are set forth in Idaho Code § 15-1-401. 
There is no question that Peterson had notice of these proceedings since she participated in them. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-106 states: 
Subject to general rules concerning the proper location of civil litigation and 
jurisdiction of persons, the court may herein determine any other controversy 
concerning a succession or to which an estate, through a personal representative, 
may be a party. Persons notified are bound though less than all interested persons 
may have been given notice. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-106 (underline added). Peterson appeared at the evidentiary hearing, 
participated, and offered her own evidence. It cannot be more clear that the court has jurisdiction 
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to determine the rights between the Department and Peterson relating to the assets of this estate, 
including the life estate. 
Finally, the evidentiary hearing was held at the urging of this Court at the conclusion of 
oral argument on Peterson's second appeal, and was for her benefit, to permit her to present such 
evidence and arguments as she thought necessary. The personal representative could simply have 
assigned the value of the life estate and proceeded to bring a partition action in the District Court. 
It seems odd that Peterson would object to the jurisdiction of the court to determine issues she 
presented at a hearing held for her own benefit. 
VI. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO GRANT AN 
OFFSET TO CATHIE PETERSON. 
Peterson complains that the Magistrate "[i]nexplicably ... disregarded Cathie's 
documented investment into the property .... " Appellant's Brief, p. 15. However, Judge Julian 
neither disregarded her evidence nor was his ruling inexplicable. To the contrary, Judge Julian 
found that the expenditures made were "improvements and not mere maintenance." 
Memorandum Opinion, p. 6. He then went on to say: 
However, there is no evidence before the court to demonstrate the enhancement in 
fair market value to the property as a result of said material improvements. The 
court agrees with the State that where equitable contractual relief is sought, the 
proper measure of unjust enrichment is the increase in value to the asset 
improved, and not the amount expended. Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 
P.2d 196 (1974). 
In her Responsive Brief, Ms. Peterson argues that she should be given a 
dollar for dollar credit, but fails to quantify the total dollar amount she seeks. No 
expert witness testimony was offered at hearing regarding the resulting 
enhancement in value to the house. Nor did Cathie Peterson, as owner of the 
property, offer the court her opinion of the property's enhancement in value as a 
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result of her improvements and expenditures. Having failed to supply the court 
with sufficient evidence to quantify her claim to enhanced value, the court must 
decline Ms. Peterson's request for a credit offset. 
This holding is well supported in the record. At the hearing of this matter, Cathie 
Peterson testified of the expenses she incurred while maintaining the real property. She also 
testified that she had never paid rent for her occupying the real property, including during the 
time that the decedent was the life tenant. She testified that the decedent went into the nursing 
home shortly after the gift deed was executed in 2001. Therefore, she occupied the home alone 
until his death in 2007. It is understandable that she would at least maintain the property. 
To the extent that Peterson sought an offset for improvements to the property, it was 
incumbent on her to show that the improvements actually enhanced the value of the property. 
When directly asked ifthe work she testified to increased the value of the property she was 
unable to say it did or to quantify it: 
Q: Do you know whether, uh, whether any of the maintenance you did 
to the house, somehow, increased it's value? 
A: Very hard to say. I don't know. 
Tr. p. 38, 11. 7-9. The Magistrate's denial of an offset is well supported in fact and law. 
VII. 
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding 
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as 
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
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witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underline added). Peterson's appeal meets the requirements for this 
section. With regard to the application of the expanded definition of estate to life estates, 
Peterson has offered no authority and no reasonable argument that the life estate is not an asset of 
the estate. Similarly, she has offered no theory of law or other authority to support her claim that 
she should be given an offset for expenditures on her home without showing any increase in 
value of the home. Finally, she continues to challenge the application of the Department's life 
estate tables without offering any alternative method of valuation. Instead, she continues to 
claim the life estate can have no value, which is part of the reason for her removal as personal 
representative which was upheld on appeal. Peterson's appeal is without any reasonable basis in 
fact or law and attorney fees should be awarded to the Department. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Cathie Peterson received the real property she now occupies as a gift. The taxpayers, 
through the Medicaid program, expended $171,386.94 in caring for the decedent after he gifted 
his property to his daughter and before his death. The law provides that the life estate which the 
decedent retained be used to offset, in a small measure, the amount expended for his care. This 
is the third appeal Cathie Peterson has brought, together with more than four years of litigation in 
an attempt to avoid this repayment. It is time the Department's rights to the life estate be finally 
established so the Department can proceed in seeking a partition and ultimate payment. 
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS/PROCEDURAL WSTORY 
In response to the Respondent's ("State;,) Brief and their Statement of Facts, Cathie 
Peterson ("Cathie") will not recite all facts in this Reply Brief, but rather respond to the assertions 
and misinfonnation contained in the Respondent's Brief. 
Procedural]y, the State misrepresents the history of this matter and the legal affect of that 
procedural history. 
While it is true the Trial Court entered an Order on June 12, 2008, requiring payment of the 
State's claim. That Order bears little or no relationship to the issues on this appeal The issue 
raised in the States Petition for Payment of Claim was whether or not their claim was valid, not 
whether or not Melvin's Estate has assets; and what those assets cousisted of, t.o satisfy the State's 
claim. 
Regardless, the State moved to compel the sale of Cathie's home on July 15, 2009, and after 
heariug on July 28, 2009, the Trial Court then entered its Order Granting the Stat.e's Petition to 
Compel Sale of Cathie's home on August 11, 2009. The August 11th decision by the Trial Court 
was appealed resulting in this Court's Decision on Appeal dated May 25, 2010, vacating the Trial 
Court's Order and remanding with instructions that the Trial Court make Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law before the legal issues could be properly addressed on appeal. 
After much passage of time and a second appeal following the removal of Cathie as 
Personal Representative, the Trial Court took evidence on September 29, 2011. as proffered by the 
State. The State asserted they were asking the Trial Court for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law as directed by the District Court on remand from the frrst appeal. FoUowing th.e hearing and a 
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briefing schedule, the Trial Court issued a Memorandum Decision on December 22, 2011, and an 
Order Re: Value of Estate Interest on January 10, 2012 . 
. Cathie timely appealed the Trial Court's Decision and Order. The State does not assert that 
this appeal is untimely or improper, but mysteriously argues without explanation that this Court 
should not hear Cathie's appeal as it somehow relates to the June 12. 2008, Order on Petition to 
Require Payment of Claim. State's Brie( Additional Issues on Appeal, p. 7 .1 
___ ,,,.,.,., __ ,_,._ ..... ~·· .. , ,., ... ,,, .. ~ ... ~ 
1 The State at various times refers to this Order by different dates. It is assumed the State is 
refening to the Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim dated June 12, 2008. 
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Il. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The State correctly recites the law in Idaho regarding Standard of Review when appealing 
Findings of Fact, but avoids discussing the Standard of Review on appeal from the Trial Court's 
Conclusions of Law or mixed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
"The review of a trial court's decision after a court trial is limited to ascertaining whether 
the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions 
of law." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout ComP._anU~ 143 Idaho 733, 735, 152 P.3d 604, 606 
(2006). 
"In reviewing a trial court's conclusions of law, however, a different standard applies: this 
court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but may draw its own conclusions 
:from the facts presented." Id; citing Idaho Forrest Industries, Inc. v. Hid<len Lake Watershed 
Improvement District, 135 Idaho 316, 319, 17 P .3d 260, 263 (2000). 
· 'When reviewing mixed issues of law and fact, the Appellate Court reviews "freely" those 
mixed issues of law and fact. Havelick v. Chobot, 123 Idaho 714, 717, 851 P.2d 1010, 1013 
(App.1993). 
____ ... ,,,---····•"' 
B. The Decision of the Magistrate. 
Section ll of the State's Respondent's Brief badly misstates and misconstrues Cathie's 
Appellant's Brief by spending several pages discussing the question of whether Cathie argues unfair 
surprise. This issue was not raised by Cathie (intentionally or unintentionally) in the Appellant's 
Brief. Rather, Appellanes Brief noted that on remand, no additional pleadings relevant to these 
issues were filed from May 25, 2010, until the trial on September 29, 2011. At trial~ the State 
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correctly represented to the Trial Court that it was seeking the entry of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, as had fuiled to occur when entering the August 11, 2009, Order Granting 
Petition to Compel. 
The entirety of Section III of Respondent's Brief is moot where the State argues that Cathie 
is appealing the Magistrate's June 12, 2008, Order. The State argues that that Order was final and 
not subject to appeal, but fails to: a) Make a connection between the June 12, 2008, Order to 
require payment of claim and the issues which are on appeal in this matter, which is the Trial 
Court's Order Re: Value of Estate Interest dated January 10, 2012; and b) the State provides no 
legal authority for its cont.ention that Cathie was required to appeal the June 12, 2008, Order 011 
Petition to Require Payment of Claim in order for Cathie to now appeal the Magistrate's Order Re 
Value of Estate Interest entered in January of this year . 
. Perhaps, the confusion found in Respondent;s Brief is due to the State's misunderstanding 
of probate law. 
Idaho Code § 17-201 defines what judgments may be appealed from the Magistrate Court in 
probate matters. 
As this Court noted in its Decision on Appeal entered May 25, 2010: 
On June 12, 2008, the Trial Court ent.ered an "Order on Petition to 
Require Payment of Claim" granting the Department's Petition and 
ordering that the life estat.e interest Mr. Pet.erson held in the real 
property at the time of his death be deemed an asset of the estate for 
the limited purpose of Medicaid estate recovery by the Department. 
The Court also ordered that the Personal Representative pay the 
Deparlment's claim to the extent of available assets in the estate. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 7 
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This District Court also held that the June 12, 2008, Order was interlocutory and not 
appeala:ble as follows: 
The trial court did not determine any value. not distribute, nor set 
aside, nor partition the life estate in the Ordet itself. Accordingly, no 
basis for appeal of the June 12, 2008, Order exists pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 17-201(4)(5) and/or (7). Therefore, that Order is 
interlocutory, oot final, and thus not appealable. 
Decision on Appeal, p.9 
(italics added) 
In short. the arguments contained in Respondent's Br:it( starting at page 9 and running 
through the rop half of page 13 were previously asserted by the State and rejected by this District 
Court in the first appeal. The State did not appeal this Court's Decision on Appeal in May, 2010. 
This Court's Decision detenn:ining the June 12, 2008. ro be an interlocutory and therefore not 
appealable Order is the law of the case by which the State is bound. 
C. Melvin's Life Estate is Not An Estate Subject to Estate Reeo\tel'y Under Idaho 
Cod~§ 56:-218(4). 
Having disposed of the red herring issues raised~ again, by the State in the first several pages 
of Respondent's Brief, we come again to the core issue on appeal, the reading of Idaho Code§ 56-
conclusion they desire rather than the conclusion found in Idaho law. 
By the Respondenfs contention,, Idaho Code § 56-218(4) abrogated the common law 
principles oflife estate, and determined that life estates are an asset of the est.ate and are valued at a 
time prior to the decedent's death. As wm be shOVYll below, Idaho's stature does not support either 
conclusion argued by Respondent. 
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I. J.C. § 56-218(4) 
First, subsection (a) acknowledges that assets of an estate should include all assets defined 
by state probate law. Idaho Code § 56-218(4)(a). As established in Appellant's Brief, that 
provision adds nothing to the common law definition, and bolsters Appellant's position on this 
appeal that a life estate is not to be included in the decedent's estate. The Smte does not challenge 
Appellant's position, and relies entirely upon subsection (b ). 
Second, subsection (b) should be read carefully for what it actually says, rather than what 
the State would like it to say: 
I "Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had 
any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest) ..... " This phrase, in and 
of itself, adds nothing to the definition, since Idaho law and common law is a clear that a life estate 
expires on death an4 therefore, decedent has no interest in a life estate at the time of death. 
2. The State relies entirely upon the latter half of subsection (b) which states 
" ..•.. including such assets oonveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual through 
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life est.at£, living trust or other aaangement." On 
this part, the State grabbed onto the words ''life estate" assuming that the Court will paraphrase the 
statute, like the State has, to conclude that said language modifies Idaho oommon law to include a 
life estate in the decedent's estate at death. The statute simply does not say that. 
When read in its entirety, subsection (b) permits the inclusion of any property held by the 
decedent at the time of his death to the extent of the decedent's interest and also allows the ~1ate to 
draw back into estate, assets which were conveyed by specific means, (i.e., joint tenancy, tenancy in 
APPELLAN'f'S REPLY BRIEF - 9 
07-19-'12 17:06 FROM-FEATµ~RSTON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-016 P0012/0022 F-126 
common, survivorship, life est.ate, living trust or other arrangement) prior to death. However, here 
Melvin never conveye.d a life est.ate. He retained one when he conveyoo fee simple title t.o Cathie. 
The State persists in ignoring the plain reading ofldaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b). The statute, 
as it plainly reads, requires the estate to include assets in which Melvin still retained a legal interest 
and which may have been conveyed by joint tenancy. tenancy in common, sllf\1vorship. life estate 
or living trust. None of these apply to the December, 2001, deed from Melvin to Cathie. Melvin 
conveyed fee title to Cathie in 2001. He retained to himself a life estate. This is nowhere discussed 
in I.C. § 56-218( 4) despite the State's insistence otherwise. 
For example, had Melvin conveyed fee ownership to Cathie in a joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, or by tenancy with right of survivorship reserving interest to himself, this would be an 
assetto be included in Melvin's estate under subsection (b). This is true even if Melvin had 
.included survivorship language, which :might normally result in title passing to co-tenants upon 
Melvin's death. 
However, nothing in the statute directs this Court to the State,s conclusion that the conunon 
law principles of life estates were abrogated by I.C. § 56-218(4). The only logical explanation for 
the State's argument is a conclusion that the State misunderstands the nature of real. estate law and 
real estate conveyances. 
The State argues an Oregon decision Department of Human Services v. Willingham, 136 
P.3d 66 (2006) as if it resolves the question of interpreting Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b). The State 
.even goes so far as to argue that the facts of the Oregon case are nearly identical. as those presented 
in this matter, a brazen misstatement of the Willingham decision. 
Oregon law and the facts in Willingham differ greatly :from the facts in this case as follows: 
APPELLANT'S ll£l>L\:' BRmF - lO 
07-19-'12 17:06 FROM-FEA'l'nr: STON LA\ll FIRM 2082630400 T-016 P0013/0022 F-126 
1. The Oregon Court of Appeals noted that Willingham involved a lawsuit by the 
Department against the son of a recipient of medical assistance. The state brought action under 
Oregon statute and regulation~ which provides that the recipient of property is liable to the State for 
the benefits claimed and to the extent of the decedent's interest in that property. 
2. In pertinent part the Oregon statute provides that "in an action or proceeding under 
this section to recover medical assistance paid, it should be the legal burden of the person who 
receives the property or other assets from a Medicaid recipient to establish the extent and value of 
the Medicaid recipient's legal title or interest in the property or assets in accordance with rules 
established by the Departrnenf'. ORS 411.620(4). No such similar provision exists in statutes of 
Idaho. 
3. There are distinctions and differences in the language of the Oregon statute than that 
found in Idaho Code§ 56-218(4). which are distinctions the State ignores in ,Respondent's Brief 
while asserting to this Court it should adopt the reasoning of the Oregon Court of Appeals. 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should disregard R.espondenes citation to Oregon 
law as binding this Court. Appellant asks this Court to review the Idaho statute on its face and 
without regard to the Oregon Court of Appeals' Decision. 
---··,.----·---·---· ...... _ ...... ,... ' ... ,. .. _ - ......... ·--
----·------
Additionally, Oregon's statutes specifically address life estates as an estate asset and how 
they should be measured in the estate at the time of death, and such statutes were discussed by the 
Oregon Court of Appeals in Willingham. 136 P.3d at 70. 
Further, Oregon has an administrative regulation, which specifically addresses how cowts 
are to include and value life estates held by the recipient of public assistance at the time of their 
death and that they are to be. valued pursuant to the table set forth in the Oregon Administrative 
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Rules irrespective of the actual lifespan of the measuring life. Willingham, 206 Or.App.156, 164-5, 
136 P.3d 66, 70 (2006); citing OAR 461-135-0845.2 
While the State in this matter argues the use of the asset transfer penalties found in Rule 837 
as a valid means of valuing the life estate, they have no rule, such as Oregon, that directs the use of 
such a table when valuing a life estate after the death of the recipient. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Respondent's assertion that Oregon law is applicable is 
unpersuasive and should be rejected. 
D. There is no Idaho Authority for Valuing a Life Estate "At the Moment Before 
Death" in the Estate of the Decedent. 
The State relies upon Iowa case law asserting that this Court and the Trial Court are 
required to look at the value of Melvin's life estate at the moment before his death to assess its 
value to the Estate for recovery purposes. The State does not cite this Court to a single precedential 
case or statute in Idaho for this contention. 
As with :the prior section, it appears the State re)jes upon Iowa Jaw resting upon case Jaw. in 
other states, specifically Iowa, which rests upon Iowa statutoiy schemes different from Idaho's law. 
Failing to reconcile this in any way, the State simply forges ahead with its fictional presumption 
therefore, is not included in the decedent's estate under the probate provisions. Tobias v. State Tax 
Commission, 85 Idaho 250, 255. 378 P.2d 628, __ (1963); 121 Am.Jur. Proof - Proof of Facts 
3d, l 01 (2011 ); Idaho Code § 15-3-706 [inventory includes that owned by the decedent at the time 
of his death). 
2 This is particularly relevant to the second half of Appellant's argument wherein Cathie 
challenges use of the Asset Transfer Penalty Table fowid in I.D.A.P.A. 16.03.05.837 also 
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In Barkema. cited in Respondent's Brief, the Iowa Court construed the value at a point 
immediately prior to death in detennining whether or not the deceased recipient's trust should be 
distributed to the beneficiaries or to Medicaid Recovery. Obviously. Barkema js disti11guishable 
since conveyances to trusts are specifically included in Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b) as an asset of the 
estate. 
The State also argues the Iowa case of Laughead, 696 NW 2d, 312 (Iowa, 2005). However, 
again, Iowa law differs from Idaho's statutory scheme. As the court in Laughead noted, Iowa 
legislation allows recovery against any interest held by the recipient at the time of death "to the 
extent of such interest including, but not limited to, interest in jointly held property and interest in 
trusts". Iowa Code§ 249A.5(2)(c)(1995). 
Additionally. Iowa Code further makes such assets expressly subject to probate. The 
Laughead court noted that as of 2002, the Iowa legislature modified the statute so as to expressly 
''reach interests in real property 'including, but not limited to, interests in jointly held property. 
retained life estates, interest in trusts"'. In Re Estate ofLaygbead. 696 NW 2d, 312~ 315 (Iowa, 
2005); quoting Iowa Code§ 249A.5(2)(c) as amended, effective April. 2002 [emphasis added]. 
Once again, the State persists in misrepresenting other jurisdiction's law to argue the 
---------·--·-···-··-·--·-····------······· ·-----·--------
outcome they desire regardless of what Idaho statute says. The State cit.es to no precedent in Idaho 
and the foreign jurisdictions cited and distinguishable with significantly different statutory 
definitions than found in Idaho law. 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should vacate Judge Julian's Order Re Value of 
Estate Interest as being erroneous as a matter of law. 
referenced as Rule 837 in Appellant's Brief, p.10. 
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E. The State Offers No Further Justification for Use of Rule 837, the Medicaid 
Asset Transfer Penalty Tables. 
Interestingly, the State makes no attempt to rebut Cathie's argument that the Asset Transfer 
Penalty Tables are, by their plain tenns, intended as a means to assess asset transfer penalties upon 
a Medicaid applicant, during his lifetime and during the "look back'' period. This is the exact 
wording of Rule 837 and the State cannot deny the intended application of Rule 837. Despite this, 
the State argues that this is the only measure that can "sensibly" be used and it is explicitly stated in 
Respondent's Brief their assumption that the Court must apply the Rule 837 Tables to the life estate 
at a point "several moments" before Melvin's death. To do otherwise, renders the State's argument 
ridiculous. 
As indicated~ the State had to convince the Trial Court and now has to convince this Court 
on appeal to value Melvin's life estate prior to his death because to do otherwise flies in the face of 
Idaho law. The value of a life estate is detennined by taking into account the age and life 
expectancy of the life tenant See West v Tax Cmmnission, 99 Idaho 21). 27, 576 P.2d 106~ 1061 
(1978). 
Clearly, valuing Melvin's life estate after his death is impossible since th.ere is no life 
·-·-"expectancY''.afterliiSdeatli.----· --· .................... ·· · 
Indeed, logic flies in the face of the State's position in this matter. The value of a life estate 
is measured by what a lmowledg~le buyer would pay factoring in the value of occupancy and use 
of the real property during the life expectancy of the measuring life. Once Melvin died, the 
valuation measures ceased to exist. 
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Additionally, the State has the audacity to argue that Cathie has offered no alternative basis 
for valuing the life estate other than the Rule 837 Table. This is a blatant misrepresentation of the 
record. The record will reflect that on August 6, 2008, Cathie filed a Motion to Hire Appraiser, and 
the State objected five (5) days later on August 11t1i. In the end, the Trial Court agreed with the 
State allowing Cathie to only engage an appraiser for the purpose of valuing fee ownership in the 
property, not a value of the life estate. To now assert that Cathie failed to offer an alternative is at 
best a disingenuous argument by the State. The State set out at the outset of this Estate in 2007 to 
dictate the manner in which Melv.in's life estate would be handled and valued using only Rule 837. 
As this Court is well aware, life estates are frequently valued by appraisers and actuarial experts, 
but Cathie and the Estate were deprived of that opportunity by the Trial Court and by Respondent. 
For the reasons set forth above, the use of Rule 837 was an erroneous valuation by the Trial 
Court and constitut.es reversible error. This Court should reverse and remand with instructions to 
value Melvin's life estate at the time of his death through the use of an appropriate, qualified expert. 
F. .Jnrisdietion 
On this subject, the State really raises no case law or argument that it has, through service of 
.process, correctly engaged the jurisdiction of the Court over Cathie Peterson, individually. The 
State seems to argue in ad na.useum that because Cathie is Melvin,s daughter that she is somehow 
"not a stranger" and, therefore, should be deemed a party to the litigation. This overlooks the basic 
principles of jurisdiction and due process cited in Appellant's Brief. The State argues that because 
Cathie offered evidence at hearing that she somehow submitted to the Court's jurisdiction and that 
due process, service of process and other jurisdictional niceties can be overlooked. Cathie Peterson, 
individually, never appeared voluntarily before the Court. Rather, the undersigned filed a Special 
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Appearance reserving jurisdictional issues on behalf of Cathie Peterson. individually, and did so 
only after the State made it clear that it intended to take Cathie's home from her in order to satisfy 
their Medicaid claim against Melvin. 
The State was forewarned of the jurisdiction issues on the first appeal to this Court, when 
the Court stated: "...... the Trial Court must have concluded that it had jurisdiction over real 
property, which is vested in a person who is not a party to the proceeding ..... " Decision on 
Appeal. ·p.10. 
"A judgment entered without meeting the jurisdictional requirements of service of process 
or due process deprives the court of jurisdiction over the person and is void." McGloon v. Gwynn. 
140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P .3d 621, 623 (2004). 
Lastly, the State argues on page 21 in Section V that the hearing in September, 2011, was 
for Cathie,s benefit. This js so perplexing as to be absurd. This Court on appeal previously 
reversed and remanded with instructions to the Trial Court that it make appropriate Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. The Trial Court in response thereto set the matter for 1rial September 29, 
2011, and the State, as the moving party, presented evidence and sought the Court's entry of an 
Order Re Value of Estate. Nothing about this procedure was for the benefit of Cathie. It was, 
------···· "'"-·-·--· > > .... ,. ' ~~ ....... '"' ~ ...... ' 
however, for the benefit of following the law and lawful procedure that this Court reversed and 
remanded in May. 2010, with instructions to take evidence and make appropriate Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions ofLaw. 
The State proffers nothing to this Court which would give evidence of its jurisdiction over 
Cathie Peterson; individually. The Court should bear in mind that Cathie had an lllltenable choice 
after the State caused her to be removed as Personal Representative: either decline to participate 
APPELLANT'S REPLY muu -16 
07-19-' 12 17: 07 FROM-FEArr·- STON LAW FIRM 2082630400 T-016 P0019/0022 F-126 
further and thereby risk losing her home. or participate reserving jurisdictional issues. Cathie chose 
the latter, but did so specifically reserving those jurisdictional issues. The State's arguments to the 
contrary are simply ·unavailing. 
G. The Trial Court Failed to Grant Cathie Appropriate Credit for Improvements 
to Her Home. 
Without citing any case law, the State argues that the Trial Court correctly deprived Cathie 
of several thousand dollars in documented improvements t.o the property. The Trial Court in its 
MeII10randum Decision likewise failed to support that finding with any law. The Appellant's Brief 
filed by Cathie in this matter has set forth the legal basis fur her recovey, and this Court is asked to 
reverse and remand with instructions to give Cathie credit for the documented improvements made 
to her property should this Court affnm the Trial Court's Order Re Value of Estate as it regards the 
inclusion of the life estate and its valuation under Rule 837. 
H. Attorneys' Fees on Appeal 
The State argues under Idaho Code§ 12-117 that it is entitled to attorneys' fees. It is clear 
that this matter is a case of first impression. as neither the State nor Cathie has cited the Court to 
any Idaho case law on the matters set forth in this appeal In matters of first impression, neither 
··--pfil1;Y is entitled to att0meys' fees. It is clear that this matter is a case of fi:rst impression. as neither 
the State nor Cathie has cited the Court to an.y Idaho case law on the matters set forth in this appeal. 
In matters of first impression, neither party is entitled to attorneys' fees. Trunnell v. Fergel, 153 
-·-·-- ·--Idaho 68; 278;· P.3d--9.38 (2012),. -However,. given the absurd and nonsensical arguments_of the_ 
State, Appellant seeks attorneys' fees on the basis that Respondent has acted :frivolously and 
unreasonably. 
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For these reasons, this Court should not award attorneys' fees and costs to the Respondent 
on appeal. 
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ID. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse the Trial Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order Re Value of Estate. 
DATED this __ day of July, 2012. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM1 CHTD. 
--___ ..... ·--······ ·-.. --···· .•..... -· ··-··-··-·-······ ........ ·- ·-·············· -·-··· ..... ···-·· ·-··--···· ·- -· .. . 
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ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
) 
MELVIN PETERSON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV07-00266 
OPINION AND ORDER ON 
APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE 
COURT'S RULING RE 
MEDICAID CLAIM 
This matter is before the Court on appeal of the magistrate court's ruling regarding the 
value of the deceased's remainder interest upon tennination of his life estate for purposes of 
Medicaid reimbursement. The Court heard oral arguments on the appeal on October 12, 2012. 
Respondent Department of Health and Welfare (4'Department") was represented by attorney W. 
Corey Cartwright from the State of Idaho Attorney General's office. Appellant Cathie Peterson, 
daughter of Melvin Peterson, was represented by Brent C. Featherston, The Court, having read 
the Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Value of Estate Interest entered by the magistrate court 
and the briefs filed by the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being fully 
advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
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FACTUALANDPRO~EDURALBACKGROUND 
The magistrate court found the following facts to be undisputed. 1 Melvin Peterson 
("Melvin") was born on and died at the age of 83 on March 3, 2007. Prior to his 
death, Melvin was the o'Wll.er ofresidential real property located in Boundary County. On 
December 6t 2001, Melvin executed a Gift Deed of his real property to his daughter, Cathie 
Peterson, retaining for himself a life estate in the property. 2 Shortly thereafter~ Melvin applied 
for Medicaid and began receiving Medicaid benefits in March 2003. At the time of his death, 
Melvin had received a total of $171,386.94 in Medicaid benefits. 
Cathie Peterson ("Cathie") was named Personal Representative of Melvin's estate in July 
2007. On August 6, 2007, Cathie sent a notice to creditors to the Department of Health & 
Welfare ("Department") but, when the Department filed a claim for $171,386.94 against the 
estate in the probate action, Cathie denied the claim without reason. The Department filed an 
Amended Claim against the estate along with a Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim. 
Cathie again denied the claim without reason and filed an objection to the Petition for Allowance 
of Amended Claim. On March 25, 2008, a hearing was held on the Departmenf s Petition. after 
which the Court entered an Order granting the Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim. 
On May 5, 2008, the Department filed a Petition to Require Payment of Claim along with 
a supporting brief setting forth the Department's demand for payment of the value of the life 
estate pursuant to I.C. § 56-218(4)(b). On May 28, 2008, Cathie filed a Personal 
Representative's Inventocy and objection to the Department's Petition. Following a June 12, 
2008 hearing, the magistrate court entered an Order establishing the life estate remainder interest 
as an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid recoyery, and ordering Cathie to amend the 
1 Memorandum Opinion of Magistrate Judge Justin Julian tiled on December 22, 2011. 
2 Cathie Peterson does not dispute that she paid no monetary consideration for the pro~rty. 
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Inventory to assign an appropriate value to the life estate, However, Cathie instead filed and was 
granted a motion to hire an appraiser to determine the fee simple value of the residential real 
property. 3 When no appraisal was ever filed by Cathie, the Department filed various motions 
relative to appraisal, sale of the property and payment of the Department's claim.4 On August 
11, 2009, the magistrate court granted the Department's motions to compel appraisal, sale of the 
property and payment of the Medicaid claim. Cathie subsequently appealed the grant of the 
motions. 
On appeal: the District Court vacated the magistrate's Order and remanded the matter 
back to establish findings of facts and conclusions of law. 5 Shortly after the ruling on appeal was 
entered, Cathie sought permission from the magistrate court to sell the property, liquidate an 
escrow account, and to pay counsel for the personal representative of the estate (Cathie),6 On the 
same day, Cathie filed an Amended Personal Representative's Inventory assigning the life estate 
zero value. 
On September 17, 2010, attorney Brent Featherston filed a Demand for Notice and 
Special Appearance) stating he represented Cathie in her personal capacity and that he was 
seeking to vacate and dismiss all orders entered by the magistrate court regarding "Cathie's'' real 
property.7 Cathie, in her capacity as personal representative of her father's estate, remained 
represented by attorney John Finney. The Department responded by filing a Petition to remove 
3 Order entered September 23, 2008. 
4 Motion to Compel Short Fonn Appraisal filed May 14, 2009; Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to 
Department and Notice of Filing Appraisal Report and Addendum flied July 15, 2009. 
5 Decision on Appeal entered May 25, 2010. 
6 Filed June 22, 2010. 
7 On appeal. Cathie argues she was never joined individually in the above-entitled action even though she became 
the owner of the home upon the termination of the life estate. However, Cathie cites the Court to no authority that 
supports her theory that she should have been joined individually. After Cathie was removed as personal 
representative of the Estate, the lower court allowed Cathie to fully participate in the proceedings, to be represented 
in her individual capacity by counsei and to be heard in her individual capacity. Of primary importance on appeal 
is the fact Cathie never raised the issue of non-joiner before the lower court and, because the issue was never raised, 
it was never decided by the lower court. Therefore, the issue is not ripe for appeal. 
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Cathie as personal representative of the estate. Following a hearing on all pending matters, the 
magistrate court entered an Order removing Cathie as personal representative of her father's 
estate. The Order was appealed but was subsequently affirmed by the District Court on May 11, 
2011. A court trial was then held on September 29t 2011. On December 22, 2011, the 
magistrate court entered its Memorandwn Opinion and on January 10, 2012 entered an Order Re: 
Value of Estate Interest. In its Opinion, the lower court held the life estate remainder interest 
was an estate asset of value for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement and that its value was to be 
determined in compliance with IDAPA 16.03.05.837.01 (aka Rule 837). The lower court's 
Memorandum Opinion is now before this Court on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statutory interpretation is a question oflaw over which appellate courts exercise free 
review. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 529, 81 P .3d 1236~ 1239 (2003). 
The objective of statutory intexpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative 
body that adopted the act. Statutory intexpreta.tion begins with the literal language 
of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in 
the context of the entire document The statute should be considered as a whole, 
and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be 
noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute 
so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant When the statutory language 
is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given 
effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction. 
State v. Schulz, 151Idaho863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011). 
It is well established that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative 
history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of 
altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. Id Only where a statute is 
capable of more than one conflicting construction is it said to be ambiguous and 
invoke the rules of statutory construction. L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand 
Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 743, 40 P.3d 96, 101 (2002). Ifit is necessary for 
this Court to interpret a statute because an ambiguity exists, then this Court will 
attempt to ascertain legislative intent and, in construing the statute, may examine 
the language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the 
policy behind the statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 
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134, 997 P .2d 591, 595 (2000). Where the language of a statute is ambiguous 
constructions that lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored: See 
Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151Idaho790, 798, 264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011). 
Peck v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 153 Idaho 37, 46, 278 R.3d 439, 448 (Ct.App.2012). 
ANALYSIS 
At issue in the instant matter is whether the magistrate court erred when it ruled a life 
estate remainder interest must be assigned value by an estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery.s 
The issue has not been addressed by Idaho's Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. The issue has 
been addressed in part by a magistrate judge in the Second Judicial District. 9 In the instant 
matter, the magistrate judge stated in his Memorandum Opinion that he found the reasoning, 
rationale and conclusions of the Second Judicial District magistrate persuasive and correct and, 
therefore, incorporated the magistrate's opinion by reference. On appeal, this Court also finds 
the reasoning and analysis of the Second Judicial District magistrate judge persuasive and 
correct In addition, the Court finds the analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Dept. of 
Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785 (2012) applicable to the instant matter. 
In her argument asserting the lower court erred, Cathy relies on common law principles 
to support her position that the life estate has no value. Under the common law~ at the death of 
one holding a life estate, the life estate ceases to exist and therefore has no value. While the 
common law espoused by Cathie is correct, her position fails to recognize that it is within the 
lawful power of the legislature to modify common law. Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical 
Center, 134 Idaho 464, 4 PJd 1115 (2000). 
8 The State asserts on appeal that Cathie may not appeal the issue of whether the life estate remainder interest in the 
home is an asset that must be inventoried and given value in the Estate for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement, as 
the issue is res judicata having been decided in a prior appeal in this matter. This Court does not find the issue res 
judicata. The lower court stated in i~ December 22, 2011 Memorandum Opinion, which is the subject of this 
appeal, that the primary issue before it was "whether the gifted life estate remainder interest can be included as an 
estate asset for the limited purpose of satisfying the State's Wipaid Medicaid lien, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
56"218(4). Clearly the lower cowt did not find the issue had been decided in the prior appeal. 
9 See Jn the Estate c/Grorhe, Nez Perce County Case No. CV02-02163, Magistrate Judge Jay Gaskill presiding. 
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Under Idaho's Public Assistance statutes, the provision for recovery of Medicaid 
benefits is found at LC.§ 56-218 and reads in pertinent part: 
For purposes of this section, the tenn "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual 
had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of such interest, 
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased 
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust or other arrangement. 
I.C. § 56-218(4). 
In order to address the definition of"estate", as established by the legislature in I.C. § 56-
218(4), it is necessary to look at the purpose behind the Medicaid program, and the recovery 
provisions under both federal and state law. 
The Medicaid program is a "cooperative endeavor [with the states] in which the 
Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid 
them in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
308, 100 S.Ct 2671, 2683, 65 L.Bd2d 784, 799 (1980). Participating states enact 
legislation and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and 
submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) for 
approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b). Upon approval, the states receive federal 
payments for the program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396. As one of the many conditions for 
receipt of federal Medicaid funds, federal law specifically regulates when and to 
what extent st.ates may recover for payments made to individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p. 
Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785 (2012). 
As was clearly noted by Idaho's Supreme Court in McCormick, 
Medicaid has always been intended to be ''the payer of last resort." Arkansas 
Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 541U.S.268, 291, 126 S.Ct. 1752, 
1767} 164 L.Ed.2d 459, 478 (2006) (quoting S.Rep. No. 99-146, at 313 (1985)). 
Accordingly, excess resources saved by virtue of Medicaid funds are meant to be 
tracked and recovered. See Cohen v. Comm'r of Div. of Med Assistance, 423 
Mass. 399, 668 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1996) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 265, at 72 (1985)); 
H.R.Rep. No. 105(!!), at 73 (1987) ("Medicaid-an entitlement program for the 
poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing home 
patients to their non-dependent children.''). 
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Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785 (2012). 
Idaho's Supreme Court has recognized that the legislative purpose behind the Medicaid 
recovery statutes is to prevent individuals from transfening their assets to survivors, heirs, or 
assign, while at the same time benefiting from taxpayer funds intended to assist the poor. 10 
Looking to the overall purpose of the recovery statutest Idaho's Supreme Court quoted the North 
Dakota Supreme Court inln re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885 (N.D.2000), which stated: 
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the 
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative 
intention to allow states to trace the assets of recipients of medical assistance and 
recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies. 
We hold any assets conveyed by [the recipient] to [the recipient's spouse] before 
[the recipient's] death and traceable to [the recipient's] estate are subject to the 
department's recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all 
property ever held by either party during the marriage. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) 
contemplates only that assets in which the deceased recipient once held an interest 
will be traced. It does not provide that separately~owned assets in the survivor's 
estate, or assets in which the deceased recipient never held an interest, are subject 
to the department's claim for recovery. 
607 N.W.2d at 886 (emphasis original) (citations omitted). 
Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785 (2012), 
The reasoning of the Idaho Supreme Court in McCormick regarding the right to recover 
Medicaid benefits from assets once held by a Medicaid recipient is equally applicable when a 
recipient conveys real property to an heir, such as a non-dependent child, while retaining a life 
estate interest. Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), which adopts nearly word for word the language found 
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), defines "estate" for purposes of Medicaid reco-very as any real 
property in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to include 
10 This purpose was also recognized by magistrate Judge 1ay Gaskill in his opinion in In the Estate of Grothe, Nez 
Perce County Case No. CV02-2163, April 22, 2008: "Medicaid is intended to act as a safety net, nm a free ride. 
Medicaid is not an avenue by which one can shift his or her financial burden for medical care to the American 
taxpayer, while a recipient's heirS enjoy a fmancia.l windfall." 
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assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement, a clear catch-all phrase. Contrary to 
the arguments of Cathie, "estate'\ as defined in J.C.§ 56-218(4), includes property conveyed 
during the Medicaid recipient's lifetime as well as conveyances that occur at the time of death, 
i.e. the conveyance of a remainder interest upon the death of the holder of a retained life estate as 
in the instant matter. Idaho Department of Health & Welf ate v. McCormick, 283 P .3d 785 
(2012). 
Idaho's Supreme Court has clearly interpreted Idaho's recovery statute as allowing the 
Department to look to "resources in which the recipient had an interest at one time but disposed 
of through her own actions or those of her spouse - such as a lifetime transfer of a home.1' Id. In 
the instant matter, the real property owned by Melvin Peterson, which he disposed of through his 
own actions, is exactly the type of property conveyance Idaho's Supreme Court has held subject 
to Medicaid recovery. The conveyance executed by Melvin Peterson falls squarely within the 
catch-all phrase "or other arrangement" used by Idaho's legislature in l.C. § 56-218(4)(b). 
Melvin Peterson conveyed, free of any cost, a remainder interest of his residential real property 
to his daughter Cathie, retaining a life estate interest for himself, and did so well within the 
applicable look-back period provided for in IDAPA 16.03.05.286. The magistrate judge 
correctly found the transfer of the remainder interest11 subject to Idaho's Medicaid recovery 
11 The parties consistently referred to the life estate as the property interest to be valued. The lower court refe1Ted to 
the property interest to be valued as the life estate remainder interest. The correct interest to value for Medicaid 
recovery purposes is the property interest that was conveyed for less than fair market value, not the property interest 
retained. It is clear the magistrate court in the instant matter understood the property interest to be valued, as 
evidence by his Order that reads, "The value of the estate's interest in the real property gift deeded to Cathie 
Peterson ... shall be that prop0rtion of the fair market value of the entire fee interest in the real property .... " 
Order Re: Value of Estate Interest filed January 10, 2012. This distinction was not made in the Second District case 
of Grothe, as the issue in Grothe was whether the Department could pllt'$ue its Medicaid recovery claim in the 
probate proceeding where its claim was against a non-probate property interest. In Grorhe, both parties looked to 
the life estate interest as the subject of the Medicaid recovery claim and, therefore, did not raise for the court's 
determination the issue of which property interest was properly subject to the Medicaid recovery claim. 
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statute and that the value of the remainder interest is to be determined pursuant to IDAP A 
16.03.05.857.01 for purposes of the Department's Medicaid recovery claim. 
Finally, the Court finds the magistrat.e court did not error in finding Cathie presented 
insufficient evidence to support her claim for unjust enrichment based on improvements she 
made to the real property at issue. The lower court correctly found the measure of damages is 
the difference between the fair market value of the real property before the improvements and 
the fair market value of the property after the improvements, not the cost of materials and labor 
expended for the improvements. See Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 619 P .2d 
1116 (1980) and Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 P.2d 196 (1974). Cathie presented no 
evidence on the property's fair market value before and after improvements. 
The last issue to be addressed is the Department's request for attorney fees on appeal. 
The Court is unable to find Cathie acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The issue 
appealed by Cathie has yet to be addressed by Idaho's Supreme Court or Court of Appeals and, 
therefore, the Court cannot characterize Cathie's appeal as unreasonable. 
ORDER 
The Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Value of Estate Interest entered by the 
magistrate court is hereby AFFIRMED. 
The Department's request for an award of attorney fees on appeal is hereby DENIED. 
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/ hand delivered via court baske~ or -={;4.l{J. 
__ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this /~ zy of 
November, 2012, to: 
Brent Featherston 
FAX: (208) 263-0400 
W. Cory Cartwright 
FAX: (208) 334-6515 
Boundary County District Court 
FAX: (208)267-7814 
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STATE OF lOAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
MELVIN PETERSON, 
Deceased. 
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CASE NO. CV-2007-00266 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, 
AND THE RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT Cathie Peterson, individually, herein 
APPELLANT, appeals pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 and Idaho Code§ 17-201, as follows: 
I. The above-named Appellant, Cathie Peterson, individually, appeals against the 
above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Opinion and Order on 
Appeal of Magistrate Court's Ruling Re Medicaid Claim ("Opinion") entered in the above-
entitled action on the 161h day of November, 2012, Honorable District Judge Jeff M. Brodie, 
presiding, and the Order Re: Value of Estate Interest, entered January 10, 2012, by Magistrate 
Justin Julian. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant 
to Rule 1 l(a)(2) and (b), 1.A.R. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
~Law"""' do{ 
'1Janid P. 7eatlierstxm 
'lJrent C. !feat/ierston• 
Jert111fj 'P. !feat/ierstxm 
Jeremi .£.Ossman 
.P1ttom1!fS at Uw1 
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(208) 263-6866 
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3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the 
Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 
(a) Did the Court err in determining that Melvin's Life Estate is an asset 
subject to estate recovery under Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)? 
(b) Did the Court err in determining that Idaho law requires valuing a Life 
Estate "at the moment before death" as an asset of the decedent's estate? 
( c) Did the Court err in determining that Idaho Code § 56-218 applies to 
life estates for Medicaid recovery purposes? 
( d) Did the Court err in determining that Rule 837 is applicable in valuing a 
life estate at the time of the holder's death? 
( e) Did the Court err in determining that this Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction to determine the issues before it? 
(f) Did the Court err in determining that the Court has personal jurisdiction 
over Cathie Peterson? 
(g) Did the Court err in determining that Cathie Peterson was not entitled 
to recoup her investment improving the property after taking title to the property from Melvin 
Peterson? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing or any portion of the record? No. 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: Oral argument on October 12, 2012. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's 
Record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, l.A.R.: All exhibits 
admitted at hearing on September 29, 2011. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter. 
(b) (1) That the Clerk of the District Court will be paid the estimated fee for 
the preparation of the reporter's transcript upon receipt of such estimate from the Court 
Reporter. 
( c) (1) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid or will be paid upon receipt of such estimate. 
( d) ( 1) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) (1) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED thisUt'afDecember, 2012. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney for Appellant Cathie Peterson 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the G? 2 ~ of December, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following 
manner: 
John A. Finney, Esq. 
FINNEY, FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
W. Cory Cartwright, Esq. 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Suite B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
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[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
't>CJ [ ] 
[ ] 
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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Facsimile No. (208) 263-8211 
Other: --------
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Overnight Mail 
Hand delivered 
Facsimile No. (208) _g,3t/- b:SIS 
Other: ~-------
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101 
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83 720-0009 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515 
ISB No. 3361 
cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov 
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STATE OF IOAHO 
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
In the Matter of the Estate Of: 
MELVIN PETERSON, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40615-2013 
Washington County Case No. 
CV-2007-00266 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
RECORD 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PETITIONER-APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S 
I 
ATTORNEY, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled proceeding hereby 
requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the clerk's record 
in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. and the notice of appeal. 
Additional clerk's record requested: 
1. 0712612007 Application for Informal Probate and Appointment of a Personal 
Rep 
2. 0712612007 Statement of Informal Probate and Appointment of a Personal 
Representative 
3. 0712612007 Letters of Personal Representative 
REQUEST FOR 
ADDITION AL RECORD - 1 Y:\MRCases\Estate\ WCC\ wee Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\Supreme Court\Request for Additional Record. wpd 
4. 11/19/2007 
5. 11119/2007 
6. 11/30/2007 
7. 12/10/2007 
8. 12/10/2007 
9. 12/13/2007 
10. 12/28/2007 
11. 04/04/2008 
12. 0510512008 
13. 0510512008 
14. 05/28/2008 
15. 06/12/2008 
16. 0711512009 
17. 07/15/2009 
18. 07115/2009 
19. 08/1112009 
20. 0911412009 
21. 0911412009 
22. 11/13/2009 
23. 12/14/2009 
24. 12/23/2009 
25. 05/26/2010 
26. 06/23/2010 
27. 06/30/2010 
28. 09/22/2010 
29. 09/22/2010 
30. 10/07/2010 
31. 11122/2010 
32. 01124/2011 
33. 02/25/2011 
34. 07/26/2011 
35. 07/26/2011 
36. 09/29/2011 
37. 11107/2011 
38. 11118/2011 
39. 12/05/2011 
40. 12/22/2011 
41. 01/10/2012 
42. 03/15/2012 
43. 05/3112012 
REQUEST FOR 
Demand for Notice 
Claim Against Estate 
Disallowance of Creditor's Claim and Request for Itemization 
Amended Claim Against Estate 
Petition for Allowance of Claim 
Notice of Disallowance of Amended Claim Against Estate 
Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim 
Order Granting Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim 
Petition to Require Payment of Claim 
Brief in Support of Petition to Require Payment of Claim 
Personal Representative's Inventory 
Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim 
Notice of Filing Appraisal Report and Addendum 
Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department 
Brief in Support of Petition 
Order Granting Petition to Compel 
Transcript Filed (7 /28/09) 
Transcript Filed (6/3/08) 
Appellant's Brief 
Respondent's Brief 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
Decision on Appeal 
Amended Personal Representative's Inventory 
Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Removal 
Order Removing Personal Representative 
Transcript Filed (10/7 /10 Petition & Motion) 
Appellant's Brief 
Respondent's Brief 
Hearing result for Scheduling and Planning scheduled on 
07/26/2011 
Court Minutes Hearing type 
Personal Representative's Requested Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Closing Brief (Cartwright) 
Cathy Peterson's Responsive Brief (Featherston) 
Reply Brief (Cartwright) 
Memorandum Opinion 
Order re Value of Estate Interest 
Transcript Filed 
Appellant's Brief 
ADD ITI 0 N AL RECORD - 2Y:\MRCases\Estate\ WCCIWCC Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\Supreme Court\Request for Additional Record. wpd 
44. 
45. 
0612112012 
0712012012 
Respondent's Brief 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
I certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of the 
district court and upon the following parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
Cathie Peterson, 
CIO Brent C. Featherston, Attorney at Law, 113 South Second Avenue, 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2013. 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
Fax (208) 334-2616 
sctfilings@idcourts.net 
RE: Docket No. 40615-13 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare V Peterson 
Boundary County District Court No. CV 07-266 
FILED 
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STATE OF IOAHO 
COUNTY OF BQUHOAERRYK GLENDA~· 
BY Of.PUT
1
Y CLERK -
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on February 27, 2013, I lodged a transcript of 52 pages in 
length for the above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of 
Boundary in the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho. 
Included Hearings: 
Motion Hearing October 12, 2012 
An electronic copy was sent to the Supreme Court at sctfilings@idcourts.net. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) SUPREME COURT NO. 40615-2013 
) 
MELVIN PETERSON ) DISTRICT COURT NO. CV-2007-266 
) 
DECEASED ) 
--------------------------------------------------------------- ) CERTIFICATE OF E)(HIBITS 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEAL TH ) 
& WELFARE, ) 
) 
Petitioner - Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CATHIE PETERSON, ) 
) 
Respondent - Appellant. ) 
---------------------------------------------------------------- ) 
I, Della A Armstrong, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District, 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary, do hereby certify: 
That the attached Exhibit List contains the exhibits which were offered or admitted 
into evidence during the trial in this cause. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Bonners Ferry, Idaho, this \'61- day of \f\(},S'\\)Q , 2013. 
GLENDA POSTON 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
1 CERTIFICATE OF E)(HIBITS 
Date: 2/6/2013 
Time: 12:14 PM 
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First J ial District Court - Boundary County 
Exhibit Summary 
Case: CV-2007-0000266 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of Melvin Peterson Deceased 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
Storage Location 
Number Description Result Property Item Number 
1 Pet Ex A: 9-29-11 Court Trial - Admitted Court File 
Copy Gift Deed, Peterson to 
Peterson 1 pg. 
Assigned to: Cartwright, W. Cory 
2 Pet Ex B: 9-29-11 Court Trial - Admitted Court File 
Copy IDAPA Rules & Tables, 3 
pp. 
Assigned to: Cartwright, W. Cory 
3 Resp Ex 1: 9-29-11 Court Trial - Admitted Court File 
Manilla envelope containing 20 
receipts for work, repair on 
Assigned to: Featherston, Brent C. residence 
4 Resp Ex 2: 9-29-11 Court Trial - Admitted Court File 
Copy of Warrant Deed, Strand to 
Peterson and Whitman, one page 
Assigned to: Featherston, Brent C. 
5 Resp Ex 3: 9-29-11 Court Trial - Admitted Court File 
Copy of Judgment, Peterson v. 
Whitman, CV 02-415, s pp. 
Assigned to: Featherston, Brent C. 
6 Resp Ex 4: 9-29-11 Court Trial - Admitted Court File 
Copy of Quitclaim Deed from 
Whitman to Peterson, 1 pg 
Assigned to: Featherston, Brent C. 
7 Resp Ex 5: 9-29-11 Court Trial - Admitted Court File 
Copy of Letter, with attachments, 
to Catherine Peterson, dtd 
Assigned to: Featherston, Brent C. 4-24-07, 8 pp. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) SUPREME COURT NO. 40615-2013 
) 
MELVIN PETERSON ) DISTRICT COURT NO. CV-2007-266 
) 
DECEASED ) 
--------------------------------------------------------------- ) CLERt<:'S CERTIFICATE 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEAL TH ) 
& WELFARE, ) 
) 
Petitioner - Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CATHIE PETERSON, ) 
) 
Respondent - Appellant. ) 
---------------------------------------------------------------- ) 
I, Della A. Armstrong, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District, 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary, do hereby certify that the above 
and foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 
28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that, in addition to the exhibits identified in the Reporter's 
Transcript, the following will be submitted as exhibits to this Record on Appeal: 
1. Transcript of hearing held on June 3rd, 2008 on the Petition to Require Payment 
of Claim, filed on September 14th, 2009. 
2. Transcript of hearing held on July 28th, 2009 on the Petition to Compel filed on 
CLERt<:'S CERTIFICATE 
September 14th, 2009. 
3. Transcript of hearing held on October yth, 2010 on the Petition for Removal of 
Personal Representative and Motion to Strike, filed November 1ih, 2010. 
4. Transcript of Court Trial held on September 29th, 2011, filed on March 151h, 2012. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said 
\ ~1- rn Court this day of ~()_\\c.X\ '2013. 
GLENDA POSTON 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 550 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) SUPREME COURT NO. 40615-2013 
) 
MELVIN PETERSON ) DISTRICT COURT NO. CV-2007-266 
) 
DECEASED ) 
--------------------------------------------------------------- ) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEAL TH ) 
& WELFARE, ) 
) 
Petitioner - Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CATHIE PETERSON, ) 
) 
Respondent -Appellant. ) 
---------------------------------------------------------------- ) 
I, Della A. Armstrong, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District, 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Boundary, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and any Reporter's Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of 
Record as follows: 
BRENT FEATHERSTON 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
113 SOUTH SECOND AVENUE 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
PO BOX 83720 I 3276 ELDER ST. 
BOISE, ID 83720-0009 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this \ ~ day of \\\CN\<.X\ , 2013. 
\ 
1. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \:j5 \ 
